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ABSTRACT

The founding o f the Federal Reserve System in the US in 1914 is viewed as a
major structural transformation of the US economy. Scholars consider that the 1914
structural change o f the US economy greatly altered the stochastic processes generating
short term interest rates. In the US case, most short-term interest rate time series analyses
suggest that prior to 1914 short-term interest rate time series were stationary whereas
sometime after 1914 they became non-stationary. In addition to this finding, some
researchers found that the same phenomenon occurred simultaneously in more European
countries.
This thesis challenges the theory of simultaneous world-wide occurrence of the
altered behavior of short-term interest rates after 1914. It employs 2296 weekly
observations of the British 60-day bankers’ drafts’ rate between 1890 and 1933. Using
augumented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression techniques, the empirical results suggest that
the founding of the Fed had no connection with the altered statistical behavior of British
short-term interest rates.
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The Altered Behavior of Interest Rates in the UK after
the Founding of the Federal Reserve System in the US in 1914

Introduction
The founding o f the Federal Reserve System (Fed) in 1914 has had a crucial
impact on the United States economy. Not only has the Fed improved the structural
stability o f the American economy, but it has also eliminated the large seasonality of
interest rates that existed prior to the Fed’s creation. Among scholars and researchers, the
improved structural stability generated by the Fed is still a matter of debate (Capie and
Rodrik-Bali, 1985; Goodfriend, 1987; Capie and Goodhart, 1995). Prior to the works of
Clark (1986), Miron, Mankiw, and Weil (1987, 1994), and Fishe and Wohar (1990), the
elimination o f the interest rate seasonality, and the Fed’s responsibility for the changed
behavior of short-term interest rates in the United States, after 1914, were issues widely
agreed upon.
It is quite difficult to clearly distinguish the factors responsible for the changed
behavior of the short-term interest rate time series. Initially, Mankiw, Miron, and Weil
(1987) believed that, after 1914, the Fed had very much to do with the alteration o f the
interest rate behavior. Angelini (1994), and Fishe and Wohar (1990) argued that many
other events could have influenced time series behavior of the interest rate. Perhaps the
Aldrich-Veerland Act o f 1908, or the Money Committee of 1914-1917, or maybe the
breakdown o f the gold standard in August 1914 could have been responsible.
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In any case, in a later paper, Mankiw et al. (1994) admitted that the founding of
the Fed might not be the only factor responsible for the altered behavior of interest rates
after 1914. “The observed change in the behavior o f short-term interest rates between the
pre-1910 and post-1920 periods may have been significantly affected by other
developments (m. n.: the Aldrich-Veerland Act, and the Money Committee of 19141917), quite apart from the foundation of the Fed.” (p. 551)
To complicate the issue even further, Clark (1986) showed that the same
phenomenon occurred at the same time in many other countries of Europe. In England,
France, and Germany, the short-term interest rate behavior changed after 1914. From
stationary time series it became non-stationary. This fact implies either that the American
events could have transmitted the altered behavior o f short-term interest rates to other
countries, or that a common group of factors, or a single event, might have influenced all
countries simultaneously. Previous works related to the pre-1914 short-term interest rate
behavior (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Goodhart, 1969) argued that short-term interest
rates “exhibited pronounced seasonal movements prior to the commencement of
operations by the Fed in November 1914.” (Clark, 1986, p. 79) Clark (1986) showed that
until the end of 1917 the Fed did not initiate the actions usually credited with the
elimination of interest rate seasonals. Consequently, the Fed could not be responsible for
the 1914 altered behavior of the short-term interest rates in the U.S. or abroad.
To test the 1914 break of the interest rate behavior, Barsky, Mankiw, Miron, and
Weil (1988) developed a different theoretical model of interest rate, monetary policy, and
inflation rates. They analyzed the interest rate pattern prior and after the 1971 breakdown
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o f the Bretton Woods regime and compared it with pre-1914 and post-1914 periods.
Their main conclusion was that the “gold standard did not play a crucial role in
precipitating the changes in interest rate behavior.” (p. 1123)
Clark (1986) argued that the Fed actions had nothing to do with the changed
behavior of short-term interest rate after 1914. Barsky et al. (1988), on the other hand,
argued that the gold standard did not influence the pattern of the interest rate after 1914.
Is there a main cause that determined the changed behavior of interest rate in the US and
UK after 1914? The next parts o f this thesis will present an extended historical overview
o f the 1890-1933 British banking system. We will identify both the historical explanations
for outliers in data, and the intricate relationships that existed in the British economy preand post-1914.
The main goal of this thesis is the study of the effects of the founding of the
Federal Reserve in 1914 on the behavior of British short-term interest rate. The period
under analysis is 1890-1933. We hypothesize the next issue: Did the Bank of England
adopt similar objectives to those o f the Fed? If this is true, then when did it begin to have
objectives similar to those of the Fed? In other words, when did the Bank o f England start
to behave as if it were smoothing interest rates? This paper employs 2296 weekly
observations of the 60-day bankers’ drafts rate. Although this rate was not directly
determined by the Bank o f England, it closely followed the official bank rate. The next
three chapters o f the thesis will include an extended historical overview o f the 1890-1933
British banking system. Chapter 5 will present a brief historical overview o f the Fed
together with some theoretical considerations on the changed behavior o f short-term
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interest rate after 1914. Chapter 6 will describe the data and its outliers. After that, in
order to evaluate the main properties o f the British 60-day draft rate time series,
augumented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression techniques will be used. The main conclusion
and a reference list will end this paper.

Chapter 1. The Bank of England From Its Origins to the First World War

1.1 The Bank of England between 1694 and the 1800s
The Bank of England, founded in 1694, is considered the oldest central bank of the
world even though the Bank o f Sweden at Stockholm began “the first issue o f actual bank
notes in Europe in 1661.” (Clapham, 1958, p. 3) This is due in part to the specific
privileges that the government gave to the Bank of England. In 1694 England was at war,
and the government needed money to finance its increased spending. The Bank of England
was a private bank chartered by the Crown to lend money to the government in exchange
for promissory notes and other privileges. At its beginning, the Bank would lend money
only to the government in exchange for the latter’s promise to pay back both the principal
and the interest. In this way the Bank’s profits were strictly dependent on the government
demand for loans. As long as the Bank would receive the amount of money it had lent to
the Exchequer plus the promised interest, there would be a strong stimuli for the Bank to
attract as much money as possible to its deposit accounts. Using this process, by 1696,
only two years after its charter began, the Bank would issue standardized notes
guaranteed by the government. In addition, the Bank performed the basic activities a
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traditional bank of the time was supposed to do. These included discount operations, the
use of write-off techniques to increase its deposit, the deposit itself, the issue o f notes,
and the use o f checks for making payments.
It is worth mentioning that in 1696 the Bank of England issued two types of notes.
One was its own, called running-cash notes (in large denominations), and the other one of
the government, called the Exchequer Bills (in 10 and 5 pounds denominations).
(Clapham, 1958, pp. 37-38) Basically, the Bank issued a note when a person deposited
gold with it, and a different type of note when the government borrowed money from it.
Eventually, the Exchequer Bills were made acceptable in the payment o f taxes.
In 1697 the Bank privileges were reinforced by a new law. The law would give the
Bank the ability to expand the standardization of its note issues, to increase the volume of
discounts, and to begin its very important trade in precious metals. But perhaps the most
important achievement of the Bank of England after the 1697 law would be the promotion
o f commerce and finance activities in London. As long as prior to 1697 the Bank had
changed frequently the look and design of its note issues, standardization o f the Bank note
issues was important to both institutions and public.
Despite periods of uncertainty, caused by frequent wars across Europe, the activity
of the Bank o f England expanded considerably during the eighteenth century. The
discount operations o f the Bank began to be openly regulated by its directors. Mainly, the
discount operations included any domestic drafts with a maturity no longer than 30 days,
and any foreign bills with a maturity under 60 days. The rates of discount would be
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changed regularly depending on many factors, such as the South Sea crisis or the Seven
Years’ War (1786-1783).
However, there were two official institutions that could trade precious metals: The
Mint and the Bank. Basically, they had the same objectives but the Mint could not issue its
own notes. Although the trade in precious metals was a statutory right of the Bank, there
were no rules that would regulate the rivalry between the Mint and the Bank.
Nevertheless, the Bank would “buy gold and silver on the best terms it can for the service
of its purposes.” (Ibid., p. 132) At the beginning of the eighteenth century the Bank
would offer itself as the central warehouse for treasure, and occasionally, to store any
imported gold or silver for which the bills o f lading were deposited with it. Accordingly,
the Bank developed the policy of making loans against gold or silver deposits.
Periodically, the charter of the Bank of England would be renewed. (The charters
were to be renewed at 50 years spans, but in fact they were renewed earlier, in 1764, and
1781.) At the same time, the new charters would further clarify the objectives of the Bank.
The nineteenth century would begin under adverse conditions for the Bank of
England. Between 1797 and 1821 the Bank suspended its cash payments to other
commercial banks because of the economic crises generated by the American and
Napoleonic wars (1793-1815). The British national debt went up, general goods and gold
prices also went up, so that it became more and more difficult for the government to
finance the war efforts of the Crown. Once the cash payment resumed by the Bank in 1821
the general price level started decreasing. It was not clear if the causality between the
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resumption of cash payment and the price deflation was very strong, since it could as well
happen that the velocity of money or the credit substitutes use increased.
Between 1821 and 1825, Britain passed through a period o f economic recovery
and prosperity. Eventually the recovery turned into a boom with full employment, strong
inflationary pressures, and speculation in both the capital market and commodity markets.
(Collins, 1988, p. 17) This led at the end of 1825 to a severe internal liquidity crisis, which
depleted the reserves of the banking system. The Bank of England only in the end averted
the threat to convertibility to its own notes, by freely lending money to those who
requested it. For this reason, the government took actions to prevent such reoccurrence in
the future. The new law would challenge the Bank of England's privileged positions by
allowing the formation of banks with an unrestricted number of partners outside a 65-mile
radius from London, and by asserting the right of the new type o f bank to participate in
the discounting of bills in London or elsewhere, provided the bills were not drawn on the
bank itself. However, the law itself could not do much to avoid the economic fluctuations
whose consequences would, in the end, impose more responsibility for the Bank’s actions.
Since the main objective of this thesis is the study of change in the time series
behavior of the interest rate after the creation of the Fed in 1914, and the data set used
covers the 1890-1933 time frame, the next two sections o f the paper will study in more
details the economic and historical events between 1890 and 1933.
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1.2 From Bimetallism to Monometallism
Starting with 1694, when the Bank of England began its activity, and until its
nationalization in 1946, when the government forcedly bought the Bank’s stocks, the
Bank remained a privately-owned joint-stock bank. Thus, the Bank’s stockholders would
expect a reasonable return on their capital. In no sense was the Bank a public agency or a
department of state, but nevertheless at the end of the nineteenth century it had developed
into a central bank. This does not imply that the Bank would control and regulate the
monetary and banking matters on behalf of the government, as it does today. In 1697 the
parliament denied charters to any other banks and in 1709 it limited the number of partners
in all other banks to a maximum o f six. In 1833 the Bank’s privileges culminated in the
declaration, by parliament, of its notes as English legal tender. From then on, the Bank
became the largest note issuer in the country -with a monopolistic power in London- and
this fact led to the consolidation of its unique position in the British banking system.
Gradually, around the 1900s, the Bank accepted broad, public responsibilities for
the maintenance of “healthy finance” by acting according to specific economic situations,
to avoid threats to the value o f the pound sterling. The Bank discouraged any speculative
practices and would act as a lender of last resort even though it was not required by its
statutes. The government did not interfere with the Bank’s activities and the Bank would
be solely responsible for the monetary situation of the country.
In Europe, by the turn o f the 20th century, the governments of most countries
would promote “central banks” with the pre-determined role of “defending” the national
currencies. France, in 1800, Italy, in 1878, and Germany, in 1876, had created central
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banks with very well specified roles. The Bank of England had existed before, but around
the same period its actions began to resemble that o f the continental central banks. The
crystallization o f the Bank of England’s activities was an evolutionary process encouraged
by a multitude of factors.
First, the Bank management o f the day responded to legal constraints and
obligations, and mostly to immediate economic pressures. Occasionally, the leaders o f the
bank might as well have been aware of their public responsibilities, but in the vast majority
o f the cases their actions were the consequences of a trial and error process. From a profit
seeking institution, at its inception, to a central bank of the nineteenth century, the Bank o f
England covered a far from smooth itinerary. Secondly, the Bank lacked any viable
competitors. The Crown never considered seriously the establishment of a public bank for
the issue o f notes or the conduct of other commercial banking business, and in fact it
retained full responsibility for the coinage. Under such circumstances, the Bank came to be
the largest and most influential British bank. The scale of its business would greatly
influence any kind o f transactions on the London money markets.
The importance o f the Bank was also emphasized by its general relationship with
the government. From its first loans to the government and to the moment when it was in
charge of handling the government’s accounts, the Bank had an independent source of
income, besides its commercial banking activities. Because the Bank was so big, it needed
to hold huge reserves of coin and bullion against its notes and deposit liabilities. Thus, the
government decided, after 1833, to keep the nation’s gold reserve in the Bank o f England
vaults. Commercial banks have also gained from this new status of the Bank, so long as
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more and more of their cash holdings would consist of Bank notes and deposit balances at
the Bank o f England. In this way it was much easier to meet their inter-bank debts or
convert notes quickly to coin. This attribute o f the central bank notes would define the
Bank o f England as the bankers’ bank.
Moreover, in times of panic or liquidity pressure the Bank found itself in the
position of the ultimate supplier of cash, as other commercial banks drew on their
accounts or borrowed from the Bank in order to meet their own customers’ needs. The
Bank acted to defend the public against unexpected losses and the result was an increased
confidence in the banking system. However, the evolution of the Bank environment was
from a very limited legal constraint based on the obligation to maintain the free
convertibility o f its notes into coin, to a more elaborate legal frame work, often imposed
by the Bank’s practices themselves.
The 19th century was a century of profound changes in Britain. Commercial
banking became the backbone of British economic development. It is surprising to see
how a private bank got excluded from sharing the newly created market for loans and
services and became specialized in exclusive functional areas. The explanation given to
this paradox was mainly of a legislative order. (Collins, 1988, p. 170) The Bank was the
largest note-issuer and depository of England’s gold reserve and had the only obligation to
maintain convertibility of sterling. Even so, from time to time, the financial system would
be stricken by crises. In those situations, because o f its gold reserves, the Bank stepped in
and made advances to the rest of the banking system so as to avoid a general collapse.
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From February 1821 until the outbreak of the First World War, Britain was on a
stable exchange rate in terms o f gold. The Bank of England was assigned by law to
preserve this convertibility. Still there was no rule on how was the Bank supposed to act
in cases when there was a threat to the gold standard. Several major crises characterized
by “acute oscillations in monetary variables” (Ibid., p. 172), called for strong regulation.
In 1825/26, 1837, 1839, 1847, 1857, 1866 the cost and availability of bank credit, gold
flows, and the number of bankruptcies underwent sharp changes.
The act of 1833 was the first step in allowing the Bank to diversify its monetary
tools. The act abolished the legal maximum o f 5% per annum on the rate of interest
charged on promissory notes and bills of exchange drawn at or under three-month
duration. Before this “liberalization” of interest rates, the Bank would have to ration the
loans when the demand for loan would increase, whereas, starting in 1833 cm, the Bank
could practice punitive rates to slow down the demand for loans. The Bank’s intentional
manipulation of the bank rate was to become an essential element of the 19th century
Bank instrumental policy.
Although the gold standard -fully legally introduced in the United Kingdom in
1844- was in a minority among trading nations, it proved to be a well-inspired decision.
Since the US had a bimetallic standard based on both gold and silver, and Belgium,
Holland, Spain, Switzerland, France, Italy, and the main German states were tied to silver
in one form or another, the United Kingdom had a privileged position. It gave a very solid
base for financial intermediation. During the last quarter o f the nineteenth century the
actual price ratio o f gold to silver decreased compared to the official price. The
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speculative operations o f financiers (based mostly in London) forced the vast majority of
the central banks to officially change from (gold and silver) bimetallism to (gold)
monometallism. After unification, Germany established a gold standard in 1873. In a short
period all other European nations switched to gold. In 1879 the US, too, adopted gold
convertibility.

1.3 The Golden Rule of the Gold Standard
As more and more countries joined the gold standard, exchange rates became
more rigid. The international gold standard imposed a system o f fixed exchange rates. It is
argued that the main advantage of this system was greater price stability. Under normal
situations, official obligations to exchange national currencies for a fixed quantity of gold,
combined with the relative freedom to export goods and services, as well as bullion, specie
and currency, would suffice to ensure stable exchange rates over a short term period
between the participating countries.
In a completely free market, the rate of exchange between two currencies would .
be determined by demand and supply. The demand for a foreign currency relative to
domestic currency increases if, say, in the domestic country the demand for goods
imported from the foreign country increases. In this instance traders would want to
convert more foreign monetary units into domestic units, thus increasing the relative value
o f the foreign units in terms of domestic units. At the same time, each currency had an
official content in gold. Consequently, the implicit foreign exchange rate would be
determined by the gold content ratio o f the two currencies. Should the market forces
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change this implicit ratio, traders had always the option of converting the undervalued
monetary unit into gold at the official rate and eventually buying back the overvalued
currency at the official convertibility rate. The effect o f this operation would actually
consist of decreasing the demand for foreign currency and thus reestablishing the
equilibrium. This implied a self- regulatory mechanism that greatly depended on the
official guarantees of the authorities to pay a fixed amount o f gold for national currencies.
Between 1877-1933 the British pound was valued at 113.0016 grains of fine gold,
and the American dollar at 23.22 grains of fine gold (99.996 % purity). The implicit or
official rate o f exchange between the two currencies was 1 pound = $ 4.866. Holders of
foreign currency would not accept anything less than the official rate as long as they could
demand gold for their holdings and exchange it in domestic units at the official rate. The
only deviation from the implicit exchange rate was due to the cost o f remitting gold
overseas. Yet, shipping, handling, and insurance costs would slightly alter the official rate.
Collins (1988, p. 132) estimated that, between 1877-1913, the actual exchange rate at
which gold would be exported from Britain to the US was 1 pound = $ 4.857, while the
gold would be imported in Britain from the US at 1 pound = $ 4.872.

1.3.1 External Balance Under the Gold Standard
Under the gold standard, the most important goal of the Bank of England was to
preserve the official parity between sterling and gold. To do this the Bank needed (and
had) an adequate stock of gold reserves. The government viewed external balance not in
terms of current accounts but in terms of a situation in which the central bank was neither
losing or gaining gold reserves. For instance, a deficit in the balance o f payments had to be
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financed by a shipment o f gold abroad. In other words, the Bank o f England tried to avoid
V*

large fluctuations in the balance o f payments. Because international reserves took the form
o f gold, the surplus or deficit in the balance of payments had to be financed by gold
shipments between central banks.
Starting with the American financial panic of 1907, some central banks (France,
Germany, and Italy) began to hold foreign currency in their reserves. The pound sterling
was the most trusted foreign currency. But most balance of payments was financed
through gold shipments. To avoid large gold movements between countries, the Bank of
England pushed the nonreserve component of the capital account surplus (or deficit) into
line with the current account deficit (or surplus). In this way, the current account balance
was financed entirely by international lending without gold (or foreign currency)
movements.

1.3.2 The Price-Specie Flow Mechanism
The gold standard contained some powerful “automatic” adjustment mechanisms
that contributed to the simultaneous achievement of balance of payments equilibrium by all
countries. Assume that Britain’s current account surplus would be greater than its
nonreserve capital account deficit. Since foreigners’ net imports from Britain were not
financed entirely by British loans, the balance of payments had to be matched by flows of
gold (or perhaps pound sterling) into Britain. The input of gold “automatically” reduced
foreign currency supplies and increased pound money supply, reducing foreign prices, and
increasing domestic (British) prices.
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Imports could be paid for by gold reserves or by selling pounds to the Bank of
England for gold and then using the gold to buy imports. The simultaneous rise in British
prices and fall in foreign prices reduced foreign demand for British goods and services.
The British current account surplus would be reduced at the same time with a reduction of
foreign current account deficits. Eventually, gold flows stopped when external balance
was reached. The same process worked in reverse to eliminate a current account deficit in
Britain. (This mechanism worked only for extremely short periods, and it was never used
in situation of financial crisis.)

1.4 The Bank Rate of the Bank o f England: The Main Monetary Policy Instrument
Maintaining the gold standard became the primary objective of the Bank’s actions.
Achieving both protection o f gold reserves and economic growth were to become a major
concern for the Committee of Treasury. The Committee of Treasury was composed of
twelve members, most o f them former governors of the Bank. The Governor of the Bank
was required, according to the Bank statutes, to inform and consult the Committee of
Treasury on major concerns of the monetary policy. The Committee of Treasury believed
that an effective bank rate meant a leading rate and not a follower. We need to remember
that the Bank o f England competed with other commercial banks, and each bank could
determine autonomously its own rate. The Committee of Treasury wanted that the bank
rate to determine (somehow) all other market rates. Consequently, the bank rate was
supposed to lead the market rates, and not vice-versa.
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The Bank realized that in order to have an influence on the money market it
needed to take measures to encourage further the money market business with the Bank.
Such steps were taken in the 1890s and they were accompanied by an increased presence
o f the Bank’s intervention in market conditions. The accepted doctrine was the fixing of
the bank rate that would be announced weekly.
Sayers (1976, Vol. I, 28-9) asserts that “there is not the slightest indication in the
Court or Committee of Treasury records of the reasoning on which each week’s action
was based.” However, there is plenty of evidence that the Bank’s main objective consisted
in “preventing gold from leaving the country, or of attracting gold to the country.” (Ibid.,
p. 29) The bank rate would be lowered when it was completely out of touch with market
rates and circumstances did not render it necessary to induce the import of gold. We can
see that the Bank’s objectives did not have anything to do with the balance of trade or
payments, the price level, the supply of money, employment, or speculation tendencies.
Securing gold reserves was the main concern of the day. It has been noted (Ibid., p 32)
that the Bank would raise the rate faster than it would reduce it.
If gold reserve were adequate and the market rate was high, the Bank would
respond in a less effective way to move the market rate down. In other words, there
existed an asymmetry in the Bank’s manipulation of its rate. The rate was supposed to be
much more effective when the gold reserve would be depleting. For instance, when gold
was exported the Bank would increase its rate immediately. Of course, the gold would
start to return to Britain. In this instance, the Bank did not reduce its rate to the former
level as fast as it had increased it.
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Another issue of concern in the gold standard equation was the high seasonality of
the demand for money. For the Bank’s leaders it was very difficult to discern between
permanent and seasonal factors. In October, for instance, there would be an outflow of
gold from Britain to the US due to the increased demand for gold o f the US during the
harvest time (US had a very inelastic money supply), situation in which regularly the bank
rate needed to be increased. If the Bank leaders believed that in December gold might be
coming back into England, then they should not have intervened in the money market.
Had the Bank not changed its rate, at the end of the year the absolute level of reserve
would have stayed intact and interest rates would have been less volatile. Consequently,
because of seasonality, the Bank gained a greater margin of discretionary action. (It could
increase the bank rate or it could not, depending on its own views on the economic
situation.)
The London bill market determined the amounts of gold export and import. In
other words, if a trader would have found it cheap to discount a commercial bill at a
London bank he could have performed more transactions in England, and more gold
would have come into England. Thus, if the Bank could influence the London bill market
(the discount rate) using its bank rate it gained more predictable control over gold
movements. In fact, in 1890s the Bank began expanding both its lending operations
(mainly by discount and advance) and its advances operations only. The Bank extended
the eligibility o f bills it would take from ordinary customers and thus the limit o f eligibility
increased from 3 to 6 months to maturity.
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Another issue connected to making the bank rate more effective was the method
that the Bank o f England would use to operate more directly on influencing market rates.
The Bank did not carry a portfolio of bills it could sell to take money off the market. An
alternative to selling bills was for the Bank to reduce the funds available in the market for
the financing o f bill’ purchases by the discount banks. The Bank had either to sell a
security o f some kind or borrow funds that would otherwise be lent to the market.
Borrowing was the preferred method used between 1891 and 1914. (Sayers, Vol. 1, p. 38)
It was surprising that the biggest customer of the Bank, the Exchequer, did not provide
any help in this matter. Only after 1914 did the Exchequer accept that the Bank could use
its notes to influence the market rate.
The movements of the bank rate were directed at protecting the gold reserves. The
rapid changes in the bank rate would hurt trade and industrial activity. A high bank rate
would increase the discount rate and merchants would find it more expensive to finance
their activity. We need to keep in mind that discounting was the main source of external
financing for the vast majority of economic agents. Under these circumstances, at the end
o f the 19th century, the Bank became aware o f the broader effects o f its policies. In the
1900s it avoided the more extreme increases of the bank rates as much as possible, and it
resorted to other measures with the objective to evade or moderate actual rises in bank
rate. After the crisis of 1905-1907, the Bank required its branches to “avoid as much as
possible any curtailment o f our regular customers for trade purposes/’ (Ibid., p. 45) Also
it advised commercial banks to cut down commitments to finance speculation in New
York. (p. 44)

18

Although the classical gold standard prohibited it, the Bank pursued a policy of
altering the gold price in order to encourage or discourage gold export or import.
Normally, the Bank calculated appropriate buying and selling prices for the principal
foreign gold coins, which would leave shippers indifferent between handling gold or other
forms of gold coins, while leaving the Bank a margin of profit when a quantity of coins
was resold in the same form. Theoretically, this should have been a stable mechanism for
the free import and export of gold.
But, on occasions, the Bank altered unilaterally (without a counter-actions from
the part of the corresponding foreign central bank) the price o f gold of some foreign coins
in order to defend its gold reserve. If the Bank did not want some specific gold coins to
leave the Bank’s vaults, it would simply increase the selling price of those coins. Because
o f this increased price, commercial banks or other money market operators were
discouraged from buying those specific gold coins (from the Bank reserves). On the
contrary, if it wanted to attract some gold coins into its vaults, it would just increase the
buying price of those coins. Sayers argues that “governors sometimes decided that one or
another o f theses devices was useful in the over-riding task of ensuring adequacy o f the
gold reserve.” (p. 51) Often this policy of direct intervention on the gold market was
accompanied by a change in the bank rate. The efficiency of such combined policies
increased, but the frequent and, sometimes, major fluctuations of the bank rate were a
major concern for the Bank‘s leaders.
The 1906-7 American crisis proved that the bank rate combined with borrowing
were effective methods o f controlling the monetary market. In the spring o f 1906 the
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economic difficulties in the US (caused by an increase o f the interest rates) had depleted
the Bank o f England’s gold reserve. The first reaction o f the Bank was to increase the
bank rate. In August when speculation in New York increased, the Bank used borrowing
in the discount market to increase the market rate. This step was not enough to stop gold
exports and it was combined with an increase in the bank rate. Latter on, these measures
still were not sufficient and the Bank started discriminating against the paper on which
money had been raised for lending to speculators in New York.
The selling price of the American eagles was raised to its maximum, but market
rates were continually above their official rate. Yet, a new set of similar operations were
undertaken and the results became observable. The gold imports increased and the bank
rate eventually decreased. In October of 1907 the crisis gained momentum once again.
The Bank did not hesitate and took one more step to prevent a new gold export wave.
Since there was a correlation between the gold reserve and the interest rate, the Bank
intended to avoid any increase in the interest rate that could have affected the British
economic activity. In addition, it refused to take any long-dated bill, so that although
market borrowing further increased, market rates remained above official rate. In
November 1907 the Bank had to increase its rate to unprecedented levels not seen since
1873 (a rate of 7 per cent). Because of this high rate, by December 1907 gold was coming
into Britain from twenty-four countries. (Sayers, p. 59) At the end o f January 1908 the
bank rate had fallen to 4 per cent.
In this chapter we have described the most important evolution the Bank o f
England passes through between 1694 and WWI. In more than two centuries, the Bank
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transformed from a purely private bank to a bank with goals similar to those of a
contemporary central bank. Next chapter will present details about the evolution of the
Bank o f England during the difficult war years and until the Great Depression.

C h apter 2. T he First W orld W ar and Its Im pact on the B ank’s Activity

2.1 From a Public to a Central Bank: The Crisis of 1914
The First World War marked, for the Bank of England, a significant step toward
its transformation from a public to a central bank. Continental European countries
anticipated the war for several months. The sterling or bills drawn in sterling were the
most accepted mean o f payment, and the world’s pressure on British denominated assets
had visible repercussions on the British economy.
In the first part of 1914 fear of war caused heavy sales of internationally traded
securities. Foreign borrowers were not able to remit in time (to the London accepting
houses) funds for paying bills falling due in the next couple o f weeks. Clearing banks
found themselves in a liquidity crisis. The historical solution to any liquidity crisis of the
banking system consisted in the Bank of England intervention. Commercial and discount
banks would seek immediate cash in exchange for bills. Although the Bank of England did
help the market in this way, the help would not be enough.
Following a decision taken by the Stock Trade Committee, on July 31, 1914 the
London Stock Exchange was closed. The discount market’s borrowing at the Bank of
England soared. Concomitantly, the gold position aggravated more the fragile situation in
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the money market. Foreign exchange rates were not favorable to the Bank o f England, and
gold was being exported in massive amounts. Clearing houses ceased or rationed the
payments o f gold to their customers in exchange for notes. This action exacerbated even
more the pressure on the Bank of England’s gold reserve. The bank rate was more than
doubled from 4 to 10 %. Because most countries lost their confidence in sterling and
despite the attractive level of interest rate, there were no overseas funding pulling in as it
used to be. The Bank remained closed for a week (between August 3rd and August 7th)
and when it reopened the bank rate felt back to 5 %. The rate would remain at this level
for the next two years o f war. When it reopened the First World War had already begun.
During the week when the Bank was closed, the Bank had to issue new notes.
Technically, the Bank issued the new notes as loans to commercial banks in proportion to
their deposit liabilities. Commercial banks paid an interest rate given by the bank rate,
which was considered by the Bank of England as the minimum rate for lending. Since
Scotland did not recognize the authority of the Bank of England, the Bank issued
Treasury notes so that these could be accepted in Scotland. As a consequence, in a very
short period, the Treasury notes issued by the Bank would become the main part of the
circulating notes in both England and Scotland. After August 20th commercial banks took
these notes instead o f gold when drawing cash used to meet customers’ necessities.
These measures proved to be extremely effective in controlling the immediate
crisis. Bill holdings were again liquid and the public confidence was restored. The Bank of
England gained not only the public’s acclaim but the commercial bank’s support as well.
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However, the international effects of the war were devastating and London’s premier
position on the international financial markets would never be restored (after the war).

2.2 Impact of the First World War on the Bank’s Activity
The crisis o f 1914 made clear that the Bank o f England was the main protector of
financial stability. Government intervention in the economy increased without any
precedent. During the war years the government strictly regulated the capital markets, the
imports, the distribution of food and vital materials, many retail prices, and the
employment force. (Collins, 1988, p. 272-3) Also, the government directly controlled or
managed the coal mines, the railways, and large portions o f the armaments industry. All
these were accompanied by increased taxes and public borrowing. Consequently, the ties
between the Treasury and the Bank of England fortified. In addition, the collaboration
between authorities and money market institutions intensified.
The Bank o f England pivotal role in the money and credit markets extended. It
became the first lender to the government before markets had settled down. In November
1914 the government initiated the long-term borrowing with a ten-year maturity. In
addition, the government could borrow at much lower rates than the bank rate. In 1915
the government issued a public offer o f war bonds, but the Bank of England had to step in
because the offer was undersubscribed.
A different aspect o f the precarious London financial situation during the war
centered on the question o f gold payments. Should gold payments be suspended? This
question was a very sensitive one. John Maynard Keynes favored a limited maintenance of
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specie payments “so as to meet foreign demands, while making it extremely difficult and
inconvenient for the ordinary man to get gold.” (Sayers, Vol. 1, 1976, p. 84)
The declared objectives of the Bank included its assurance that the banking system
as a whole would facilitate the war effort; to conserve the principle o f external
convertibility o f the pound sterling; to lure to London as much foreign currency as
possible; and to acquire the channels necessary to attract war supplies from other
countries (mostly from over the Ocean). Before the US entered the war in March 1917
there had been discussions between France and Britain, on the one hand, and the US and
UK on the other hand, to buy as much war supplies as possible from the US. The
financing would not be assured in all the cases by the European central banks. In those
instances when there was no agreement between the purchaser and the buyer, some
American intermediation firm (Morgans) would perform foreign exchange transactions,
mobilization o f U.S. securities held abroad, flotation of public debt, and overdrafts on
behalf of foreign governments.
Little by little, the British balance o f payments would swing one way only (always
in deficit), and since there were fixed exchange rates, gold started crossing over the
Ocean, first to Ottawa, and then to New York. Because the speculation was that more
gold would be shipped over to the US, the value of the sterling would depreciate even
more compared with the US dollar. At this point, in November 1915 the Treasury
appointed a committee whose main role was to defend the exchange rate. Although the
committee proved to be very effective with respect to other exchange rates, it was not
effective with the US dollar exchange rate.
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The next step for the British Treasury was to borrow money directly on the New
York market. In the Fall o f 1916 Britain issued Treasury bills in New York. Yet, the Fed
did not allow the American banks to buy these bills until February o f 1917. (The US
would enter the war next month.) After April 1917 the cooperation between the Bank of
England and the Fed would intensify. As a consequence, more inter-government loan
agreements would be signed in April and May of 1917.
During the remaining period of the war, the issue o f government stock reached
unprecedented levels. Since both the Treasury and the Bank wanted to attract more
“deposits” into their accounts, the Bank had to use an additional type of interest rate:
Treasury Bill rate. For this reason the Bank started differentiating between deposit rates
on home and foreign money. The rate on foreign deposits remained at a higher level than
on domestic rates. (For instance, in January 1918 the rate on domestic deposit offered by
clearing banks was 3.5 % whereas for foreign deposit was 4.5 %.) Commercial banks
were also required to discriminate on the same basis. At the end o f 1917, due to a higher
influx of foreign deposits and severe restrictions on the exports of capital the Treasury bill
rate fell from 4.75 to 4 %. Treasury hoped that these reductions o f rates on the short term
deposit would encourage people to invest in longer term bonds that were still issued.
For the Bank of England, the broader association with the government and with
the conduct of monetary policy increased its influence within the domestic economy. Some
o f the responsibilities for managing the national debt could limit the Bank’s actions so long
as the government had somehow more divergent interests than those o f the Bank. Only
when the war was over could the Bank clarify its divergence with the Treasury. Generally
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speaking, by the end o f the war, the Bank of England had already become a pillar o f the
British economy, although its roles were not accurately defined and understood.

Chapter 3. The Return to Gold in 1925 and the Economic Crisis of 30s

3.1. The Accumulated National Debt and the International Cooperation after War
During the war, the Bank of England lost control almost entirely over the quantity
o f money in circulation. Since the Treasury had issued bills to cover the financing needs of
the war economy, the market could get unlimited cash at the discount rate at which
Treasury bills were available. In other words, there were two issuers o f notes. In addition,
both types o f notes played similar roles. By the end o f the war the government
accumulated a huge deficit. Usually, the government issued new notes to pay off its
“older” debt (consolidate its debt). Consequently, since the government wanted a lower
rate to re-finance its debt, it preferred lower interest rates. (We need also to remember
that, immediately after the war, a hypothetical monetary operator could borrow short-term
money only from banks, but he could lend short-term money to either the Treasury or
banks. Under such conditions one would deposit money where there was the highest
expected interest.) At the same time, as we have seen earlier, the Bank o f England used to
increase the interest rate to protect its gold reserves. For this reason, there existed a
contradiction between the Bank’s objective of protecting the gold reserve by increasing
the rates and the Treasury’s needs of a cheaper way to finance its deficit.
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Basically there were three ways o f “managing” the debt: running a budget surplus,
consolidation o f the short term debt, and increasing capital taxation. None o f them proved
viable as both a budget surplus and increased taxation would have jeopardized the
governm ents fragile political situation. The consolidation of the short term debt was
highly dependent on the bank rate, and the Bank of England could not afford to reduce it.
The Bank o f England was more concerned with restoring the gold convertibility o f sterling
at its pre-war level ($4.86 = 1 sterling). In the US, interest rates were higher than in the
UK. Had the British bank rate been reduced, the interest rate differential between the US
and UK would have encouraged the gold exports from the UK to US. In fact, the market
speculated (it was extremely profitable to export gold to the US) on this possibility and
the sterling exchange rate undervalued constantly the official pre-war rate. Eventually, at
the end of March 1919, the Bank decided to prohibit the export o f gold coin or bullion.
Despite several major increases of the bank rate, by February o f 1920 the US
dollar/sterling exchange rate dropped to a minimum of $3.2/pound. (As compared to its
pre-war benchmark of $4.86.) At the same time, the British economic situation was
unprecedented. The economy operated at the same time at full employment, high inflation,
and an unfavorable exchange rate. Under these circumstances, as well as facing major
difficulties in settling down the inter-allies debt (the operational debt created during the
war between France, the US, and Britain), the B ank of England started periodical
consultations with the New York Federal Reserve Bank. The international contacts o f the
Bank had as the ultimate goal “to see the monetary systems o f Europe once more bound
together in an international gold standard.” (Sayers, Vol. 1, 1976, p. 120)
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Meanwhile, the British and American authorities tried to coordinate their actions
so that the interest rate differential become minimal. In April 1920, the Bank had to cut its
bank rate because the Treasury had just done the same thing for the T-bill rates. In the
same day, even before this decision was to be carried out, the governor o f the Bank
“cabled to the New York Federal Reserve governor” (Ibid., p. 124) in order to determine
him to make a corresponding reduction. For a couple of years this policy o f continuously
informing each other about everybody’s short term intentions was effective. The
speculations against interest rate differential between the U.K. and the US ceased and by
April 1922, the exchange rate o f US dollars dropped to around S4.45/pound.

3.2 The 1925 Return to Gold
During 1923 not only British prices were growing faster than the American prices,
but an agreement had been reached on the war debt to Washington. The immediate
consequence of price level differential and supplemental debt-connected pressures was a
substantial depreciation of the U.S. dollar - sterling exchange rate. The Bank wanted to
increase its rate, but the Treasury opposed it vehemently. First, the unemployment rate
was very high. Second, industry and trade would protest in the face of more expensive
credit. Third, since the export o f gold was forbidden until the end o f 1925, the bank rate
lost much o f its pre-war significance. For these reasons, it seemed that the main monetary
policy objective changed from preserving the gold standard to preserving the value of
money. Keynes observed this discrepancy and believed that it was due to the stubbornness
o f the Bank to return to the pre-war parity rate. (Collins, 1988, p. 279) The pre-war
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parity rate over-valued sterling by about 10% and if it had been reinforced it would have
hurt the British economy even more.
Although there were solid arguments invoked against a return to the gold standard,
in April of 1925, the Bank decided to return to gold convertibility of sterling at its pre-war
value. The new monetary environment imposed a withdrawal of the technical convertibility
of notes into gold coins, and set a minimum of 400 ounces of gold (1700 sterling) for
conversion of notes into bullion. Another concern was the concomitant existence in
circulation of Treasury and Bank note issues. Because the Bank needed to know how
much gold it should keep in its vaults, there was a consensus over the fact that only after
two years o f the gold standard the Bank would amalgamate the notes. In November 1928,
the Treasury and the bank notes in circulation were merged into a single Bank note issue.
The decision to return to the gold standard at its pre-war parity was a subject of
contention. The policy options of the Bank and the government were severely restricted
by the fact that every single policy had to be subordinated to the needs of sustaining the
convertibility. Unemployment rate, balance of payments, government deficit, and gold
reserves were the major unknown of the monetary and budgetary policy implications. For
instance, “once a decision had been taken, an expansion within the domestic economy to
reduce unemployment rates could not be countenanced if there was any danger that this
might weaken the balance of payments and endanger the reserves.” (Collins, 1988, p. 281)
Friedman and Schwartz (1982) have clearly shown that once the gold standard was re
introduced in the U.K., the monetary deflation it caused damaged non-reversibly the
macro-economic equilibria. The 1929-33 crisis highlighted the nature of this constraint.
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Had the British authorities allowed a ten per cent devaluation o f sterling in 1925,
the current account would have been improved by around 70 million within three years
and the unemployment rate would have been smaller with 2.4 to 3.5 % than it actually was
after five years. (Ibid., p. 283) Yet, if a devalued sterling had been adopted, there were
high chances that other nations would have retaliated by either increasing trade
restrictions, or devaluating their own currencies.

3.3 The Crisis o f 1929-1933
After the gold standard was reinstated in 1925, the Bank’s policies diversified. One
o f the most important new policies consisted of the Bank’s increased role in trading
foreign currencies. For instance, had the interest rate increased in New York, the Bank
would have sold dollars (from its own reserves) in London market to protect the flow of
sterling out of Britain. Doing this, the Bank could achieve two goals.
On the one hand, it preserved its gold reserves. On the other hand, the Bank
gained an additional policy tool. It did not have to only increase its rate to protect the gold
reserve. (This policy became controversial mostly when unemployment rate reached high
levels.) Consequently, the Bank began keeping a reserve o f foreign currencies in its vaults
to intervene in the foreign exchange market, should the sterling deteriorate. The Bank
faced two major obstacles in using this (new) policy of controlling the gold movements.
One obstacle was given by the limited amount of foreign currencies the Bank possessed.
Another obstacle was the unpredictable length of the period o f time the interest rate
differential persisted. During the war the monetary international coordination between
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France, the United Kingdom, and the United States increased but, after the war, it was not
enough to prevent the individual economic crises. For example, from February to July of
1928, the New York Federal Reserve discount rate went up from 3.5 to 5 %, while the
Bank o f England rate stayed at 3.5. The Bank’s reaction was first to sell dollars in
London, and when its dollars reserves were diminishing to allow gold to leave to or from
New York and to increase its rate to 4.5%. Even so, since in New York the call rate was
between 7 and 8 % this policy proved ineffective. The Bank, once again, had to
manipulate gold prices to impede the gold flow over the Ocean.
In August 1929, the New York discount rate increased to 6 % and the Bank of
England was facing again a monetary crisis. At the end of September the London rate
increased to 6.5 %. At the end of October 1929 the Wall Street Stock Exchange
collapsed. It is still debated if the interest rates increases on either side of the Ocean had
something to do with the stock exchange collapse (Friedman, and Schwartz, 1982). By
May 1931, the bank rate was gradually reduced to 2.5 % while the New York rate was
reduced to 1.5 %. These steps proved to be insufficient in the face o f a very weak U.K.
trade balance which uhad left London with short liabilities greatly in excess o f the gold
and foreign exchanges reserves in the Bank.” (Sayers, 1976, Vol. II, p. 389) In May and
June 1931, a series of liquidity crises took place in Germany and Austria. The foreign
liquidity crises accentuated the London liquidity crisis. London tried to defend its currency
against speculation expecting devaluation by taking international loans. Between July and
August 1931, New York and Paris provided the Bank of England over 180 million pounds
in loans to help it to defend the short term obligations.
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In September 1931, Britain suspended gold convertibility of sterling. Some major
factors have determined the Bank to take this drastic step. There have been three
important causes behind this decision: i) the huge UK trade deficit, ii) the over-valuation
o f sterling, and iii) the increased budget deficit. (Collins, 1988, p. 284; Sayers, 1976,
p.3 87-415) The first two causes were inter-related. Had the UK reduced the gold content

o f sterling, the “value” o f British purchases abroad would have decreased. (As I
mentioned before other countries would have done the same thing.) Thus, the trade deficit
could have been reduced by simply changing the gold definition of sterling. At the same
time, since foreigners had more short-term claims on Britain and British investments
abroad were predominantly for long terms claims “the claims on Britain could be
liquidated more quickly than British claims on foreigners.” (Collins, 1988, p. 288)
As far as the budget deficit, the Treasury-notes that were exchanged in 1928 for
the Bank-notes put additional pressure on the money market behind the Bank’s control.
So long as the unemployment rate in the UK was at over 10 %, the Bank hesitated to
increase its rate, the bank rate had lost much of its pre-war effectiveness.
The Great Depression affected most o f the world’s leading economies. Income
contracted, prices deflated, profits decreased, and the bankruptcies rose. Unemployment
rates reached unprecedented levels. The UK felt the effects of the world recession.
London lost much o f its former international position.
Getting off the gold standard in 1931, the Bank of England gained the freedom to
change its monetary policies much faster than under the gold standard. Although
theoretically the gold standard did not give too much room for discretionary actions,
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during periods with high unemployment rates the Bank had either delayed to obey the
rules o f the game or changed them. Until 1931, the discretionary actions o f the Bank were
occasionally determined by the government’s interests. After 1931, the government’s
interests became the main discretionary objectives for the Bank. (Which basically meant
that the Bank gave higher priority to public interest, such as unemployment or real wage.)
During the 1929-33 crisis the Bank’s collaboration with the government increased in order
to attenuate the devastating effects of unemployment and price deflation.
Immediately after the suspension of gold convertibility the pound depreciated, and
exports increased. France, in 1936, and the US, in 1933, followed Britain in going off the
gold standard, but the lag helped Britain to encourage domestic consumers to buy
domestically-produced goods. (In his period the relative sterling price o f imports had
increased.) During the Great Depression years the Bank and the Treasury decided to
manage the exchange rate. The exchange rate floated freely but the authorities reserved
the right to intervene in the supply and demand of foreign currencies at any time. This
period came to be known as a “dirty float” exchange rate. (Collins, 1988, p. 296) There
was established an intervention fund with the objective to “reduce the amplitude of
fluctuations (o f the exchange rate) without seriously influencing long-term trends in
sterling’s value.” (Ibid.)
In addition to controlling the sterling’s exchange rate, the Bank of England had
also used a policy o f “cheap money” to encourage economic growth and diminish the
national debt. Ifin October 1929, at the beginning of the crisis, the bank rate was 6.5 % it
was only 2 % by June 1932. (Collins, 1988, p. 298, and Sayers, 1976, p.430) Although
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many serious problems remained after 1932 the use o f the “cheap money” policy stopped
the decline of the economy and it encouraged the economic recovery. In 1937 industrial
production reached its pre-WW II-war peak and grew at a rate of 7.8 % p.a. (Collins,
1988, p. 301)

3.4 Summary of Historical Events
October 1694 - The Crown chartered a private bank, the Bank o f England, to
finance the war.
1873 - Bagehot, Walter published Lombard Street: A Description of the Money
Market, the first theoretical study to suggest that the Bank of England be a
lender of last resort “irrespective of anything.” (Sayers, vol. 1, 1976, p.
47)
1800 - The National Bank of France was created.
1844 - Gold standard fully introduced in Britain.
1876 - The National Bank of Germany was founded.
1878 - The National Bank of Italy was created.
1877 - Treasury bills issued weekly on tenders kept by the British Treasury at the
Bank o f England.
1890s - The Bank o f England adopts measures to encourage the money market
business with the Bank in order to achieve a greater control o f the market
interest rates
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1906-1907 - American financial panic that resulted in massive gold exports from
Britain to the US. To protect its gold reserves, the Bank of England
increased the bank rate to an unprecedented level of 7 %.
July 31, 1914 - August 7, 1914 - Due to the war, the London Stock Exchange and
the Bank of England closed. Gold payments suspended.
November 1914 - The Treasury initiated long term (over 1-year) borrowing.
The Federal Reserve System begun its operation.
April 1917 - The US entered the WWI.
1922 - International Monetary Conference of Genoa aimed at restoring
the international gold standard and settling inter-allies debt.
1925 - Gold standard exchange rate parity restored at its pre-war level.
1929-1933 - Great Depression.

Chapter 4. The Founding of the Fed and Some Theoretical Considerations on
the Altered Behavior of Interest Rate After 1914

4.1 A Brief Historical Overview of the Founding of the Fed
Between 1863 and 1913 the structure o f the US banking system and its activity
was mainly determined by the provisions of the National Banking Acts o f 1863, 1864, and
1865. These Acts were drafted to both solve the problems o f the financial system that had
existed before the Civil war and to increase revenue for the North during the Civil war.
Before the Civil war, the frequency of financial panics as well as the number o f bank notes
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in circulation was very high. One o f the most notable successes o f the Acts was the
elimination o f multiplicity o f note issue that had existed prior to the war. Yet, the major
cause of financial panics (an inelastic money supply) was not eliminated. The supply o f
money remained greatly inelastic, and for this reason, the frequency o f financial panics
continued to remain extremely high. (Miron, 1986, p. 129) In order to understand lack of
money supply elasticity one has to understand the tendency of the money supply to
contract in exactly those periods o f the year when it was needed most.
For instance, the large proportion of agriculture in national income had major
economic consequences during two major seasons. One was in the spring planting season,
and the other one was in the fall crop-harvesting season. During these periods not only did
farmers need more currency and credit to have the seasonal work done, but corporations
were required to pay quarterly interest and dividend settlements. Although the dynamics of
each financial panic was different, the trigger element of every panic was the same. There
was an increased demand for bank reserves that could not be satisfied for all parties
simultaneously in the short sun.
The events that precipitated the creation o f the Fed started with the financial panic
of 1907, which accelerated the passage of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act (enacted in June
1908) and the creation of the National Monetary Commission. On the one hand, the
Aldrich-Vreeland Act was designed to give New York City Banks greater powers in cases
o f emergencies. On the other hand, the National Monetary Commission was assigned the
task o f studying international banking systems in order to determine the future o f the
American banking system. In 1910 the Commission published a report that recommended
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the creation of the Federal Reserve System. In 1913 the US Congress passed the Federal
Reserve System Act, and in November 1914 the twelve banks o f the Fed opened for
business. (Barsky, e ta l, 1988, p. 126)
The Fed was mainly created to eliminate seasonal interest rate fluctuations in the
US by using an “elastic currency.” Consequently, the Fed would introduce “appropriate
movements” into the supplies of currency and high-powered money. Actually, the Fed
was supposed to increase the money supply during the spring and fall seasons, when the
demand for money was at its highest levels. Also, the Fed would try to eliminate the inter
regional interest rate differentials.
The effects and the timing of the Fed’s actions remain controversial. The next two
sections will present the main issues concerning the much debated impact of the central
bank’s founding on the time series behavior of interest rates.

4.2 Interest Rate Smoothing
According to its statutes, the Fed sought to smooth nominal interest rate
movements occasioned by transitory disturbances to money demand, and/or aggregate
supply. In other words, the Fed tried to control nominal interest rates directly. Using basic
assumptions on money demand, money supply, and a relationship between the nominal
interest rate, the real interest rate, and the (expected) inflation rate, Goodfriend (1987,
1988) presented the mechanism of interest rate smoothing. Goodfriend (1988) believed
that “at each point in time, the money supply rule allows the public to form a determinate
expectation o f the future nominal money stock.” (Goodfriend, 1988, p. 229) At the same
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time, the relationship between money supply and money demand would determine the
nominal level of interest rate.
If the central bank pursued a future price level target (so that the inflation rate
were stationary) “nominal interest rate smoothing would make the real interest rate shock
move the current price level around.” (Ibid., p. 229) In reality, the central bank would not
be indifferent to the idea that the current price level was erratic. For this reason, a central
bank wishing to “minimize price level forecast error and smooth nominal interest rates can
create the necessary inflation or deflation by moving the expected future price level around
instead.” (Ibid., p. 231) Under such circumstances, the error variance of both price level
and money stock forecast go to infinity. Despite the lack o f theoretical support of
Goodfriend’ s model “it appears that interest rate smoothing is a policy widely followed
by world central banks because they believe that the financial stability it buys is worth the
cost in increased price level instability.” (Ibid., p. 231)
Goodfriend’ s model did not accommodate for either institutional or instrumental
policies that could compensate for the theoretical lack of stability of a monetary system
where central bank followed interest rate smoothing. In addition, Goodfriend did not
consider incorporating the rational expectations theory into the interest rate smoothing
theory. Assume that one anticipates that, starting with a given point, interest rates cease to
fluctuate as it happened in the past, then she/he will modify the expected (future) level of
both money supply and demand. As we will see in the next section, there is plenty of
empirical evidence indicating that, after 1914, interest rate smoothing was practiced by the
Fed.
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4.3 Literature Review
Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987) published a very influential article related to the
adjustment o f expectations to a change in regime. The main focus o f their study consisted
of an investigation o f the impact on economic decisions of the newly created economic
environment that appeared in the US after the founding of the Fed. Basically, they
questioned the speed with which the economy moved to a new level o f rational
expectations. According to the expectations theory of the term structure, the long-term
level o f interest rate would be related to current and expected future short-term rates. The
future expected change o f the present interest rate is greatly influenced by currently
available information.
Had one known that an institution was supposed to eliminate the large fluctuations
o f interest rates, both over time, and geographically, the absolute value of future expected
changes of the interest rate would have been lower. Consequently, economic decisions
would have been modified by the presence of such an institution. The Fed openly asserted
that it “will put an end to the annual anxiety from which the country has suffered for the
last generation about insufficient money and credit...” (Ibid., p. 360)
Mankiw, etal, (1987) found that “the evidence strongly indicates that financial
market participants understood the intentions of the new institution.” (p. 361) They
analyzed the three-month time loan rate series available at New York banks for the first
week o f each month between 1890 and 1933. Between 1890 and 1910 short rates “were
quickly mean-reverting and highly seasonal.” (p. 358) From 1920 to 1933 interest rates
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were close to a random walk. This proves that, between 1910 and 1920, a major change in
the stochastic process generating short-term interest rates occurred.
They also tested the rational expectations theory. In addition to the three-month
rate, they used the six-month rate series to determine if the long rate included an
expectation o f a future shock. Thus, a change in the stochastic process generating short
rates needed to modify the theoretical relationship between short and long rates. So long
as “shocks to the short rate were less persistent in the 1890-1910 period than in the 19201933 period, the long rate should be less responsive to the short rate in the 1890-1910
period.” (Ibid., p. 359)
Because the 1910-1920 period leaves much to speculate about the causes o f the
changed behavior of the stochastic process of (short-term) interest rates, the authors
performed switching regression techniques in order to determine the most likely date for
this change. They found that “the most likely date for the change in the stochastic process
of the short rate is between December 1914 and March 1915.” (p. 359) The Fed began its
operations in November 1914. The results strongly suggest that immediately after the Fed
had begun to operate, market participants fully became conscious of its role.
Consequently, a new rational expectations equilibrium point was rather quickly attained.
Angelini (1994) asserted that Mankiw e ta l (1987) did not fully consider some
historical events and institutional changes in the New York money market that might have
had an impact on short-term rates. The three-month data series used by Mankiw et al. “is
affected by errors” (Angelini, 1994, p. 562) for the 1908-1918 period. Fishe and Wohar
(1990) noted that in the original sources there were missing observations, reported
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as nominal, or observations with other further conditional qualifications (i.e. , that a
commission was paid to the lender). For the 1890-1907 period the three-month data series
had 72 observations which were in error, whereas for the 1918-1933 period, 19
observations were in error. (Fishe and Wohar, 1990, Table 1, pp. 970-71)
Angelini (1994) argued that the Aldrich-Vreeland Act (according to which call and
time loans on the New York money market were fully collateralized) enacted after the
1907 panic, had a major role in the elimination of future financial panics and thus it deeply
affected short-term interest rate behavior. For this reason, if one wanted to test for the
effects of the Fed’s founding on interest rate behavior they would need to eliminate the
periods o f financial panics. (This is so because a simple AR model would fail to predict the
occurrence o f a financial panic.)
Another point made by Angelini against the “Fed effect” was the fact that during
the First World War the New York money market was under the control o f the Money
Committee. The Money Committee permanently changed the functioning of the money
market. When the war ended, the money market had already been altered and it would not
be necessary to analyze a longer time frame than 1908-1918. Angelini considers that the
shift in the series of the short-term interest rates between 1890-1910 and 1920-1933
subperiods might have occurred in at least two stages over the analyzed period. Mankiw et
al (1987) looked specifically for only one break point in the period they considered. In
conclusion, the choice of sample period has tremendous implications on testing for the
“Fed effect” on the short-term interest rate behavior.
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For the 1908-1918 period, Angelini (1994) showed that “there was no parameter
shift in the years astride the foundation o f the Fed or that a parameter shift is impossible to
detect because o f the low power o f my tests.” (Ibid., p. 564)
After this critique, Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1994), in a reply, studied again the
short-term interest rate behavior for the 1890-1933. They found that the analysis o f the
time series behavior of the three-month rate had to consider both the 1907 financial panic
and the 1917-1919 period o f administered interest rates. Also, the Aldrich-Veerland Act,
passed in June 1908, “was a major step towards preventing financial panics and can
indeed be considered as an initial move toward the creation o f the Fed.” (Ibid., p. 548)
The Aldrich-Veerland Act was supposed to expire in June 1914, but because the
Fed was due to open for business in November 1914, the Act was prolonged for another
year. Fishe and Wohar (1990) noted that “the U.S. Treasury, acting under AldrichVreeland, issued over $382 million in emergency currency during the year following June
1914”. After using an AR(1) model and F-statistic for more sub-periods that in their initial
study, Mankiw et al. (1994) found that “the exclusion o f data points affected by the
aftermath o f the 1907 panic is crucial to the finding o f no structural change, and in my
view is warranted by the fact that the threat of banking panics had already been largely
defused by the Aldrich-Vreeland Act.” (p. 551) However, the most important conclusion
is that the founding of the Fed was not necessarily responsible for the changed behavior of
short-term interest rates. Angelini (1994) argued for two more potential switch points: the
Aldrich-Veerland Act o f 1908, and the Money Committee which administered effectively
the short term rates between 1917 and 1919. Subsequent empirical results will show that
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in the UK, there were identified statistical signs o f changed behavior of the short-term
interest rate prior to the founding of the Fed, in 1914.
Miron (1986) showed that after the creation o f the Fed the “frequency o f financial
panics and the size o f the seasonal movements in nominal interest rates both declined
substantially.” (p. 125) In other words, he extended even further the implications of the
Fed’s founding in 1914. The seasonal open market policy conducted by the Fed
eliminated seasonal movement in nominal interest rates and decreased the frequency of
financial panics. Thus, the regular actions of the Fed were consistently anticipated by
market participants, with real positive effects on economic stability. This is in contrast to
R. Barro (1977, 1978) who argued that “only unanticipated changes in money have real
effects.” (Miron, 1986, p. 125)
For a researcher it is difficult to identify a unique neutral monetary environment in
which both the anticipated and unanticipated policies can be easily distinguished. During
1914 there occurred more events than the founding of the Fed. Some had been anticipated
and some not. Which of these could be held responsible for the changed behavior of
interest rate observed thereafter? If the unanticipated events (the gold standard elimination
or the war) prevailed, Barro and Lucas would be correct, asserting that only unanticipated
changes in money would have real effects. If the anticipated events (the creation of Fed
and its expected actions) were more important, the rational expectations theory would be
inconsistent. Sargent (1976) suggested that the debate would be clearer if one would
analyze data from two or more different policy regimes.
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Miron (1986) analyzed the 1890-1933 period. He considered the occurrences of
financial panics for the 1890-1914 sub-period and he showed that, although after 1914
there were several economic recessions, only during the 1929-33 crisis did the banking
system experience a financial panic. Using a Bernoulli distribution he clearly showed that
“the data reject the hypothesis of no change in the frequency of panics at the 99 percent
level of confidence.” (Miron, 1986, p. 131) In other words, the frequency distribution o f
financial panics suffered a (statistically) significant disruption in 1914. A financial panic
supposed a combination o f bank failures, bank runs, and stock market crashes. Usually it
all started with an unexpected large deposit withdrawal or a very large loan default.
A second aspect o f Miron’s paper accentuates the much smaller size of seasonal
movements in nominal interest rate after 1914. He used weekly data for the interest rate
on stock market call loans. Also, employing the loan-reserve ratio o f the whole banking
system, he was able to determine that there was a reduction in the elasticity o f loan supply
with respect to the interest rate after 1914 as compared to the 1890-1914 period. This
implied a smoother behavior of nominal interest rates after 1914. Clearly, in 1914 there
was a clear shift in policy regime.
The question of direct and immediate causality between the Fed founding and the
changed behavior o f the short-term interest rate series has become even more
controversial after an article published by Clark in 1986. Although Clark (1986) focused
on deseasonalization o f interest rates after 1914 in the US, he extended the analysis to
more countries. He found that “interest rate seasonal disappeared in the U.S. and other
countries approximately at the same time,” and in the U.S. case “interest rate seasonal
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ended approximately 3 years before the seasonal movements o f currency and highpowered money changed.” (Clark, 1986, p. 76) Clark used data for the call money rate,
60-90-day commercial paper rate, and 90-day time money rate, for two major sub-periods:
1890-1913, and 1919-1932. Using sample annual autocorrelations o f the first differences
of both short-term M erest rates and currency in circulation, bank reserves, and highpowered money, (for the two sub-periods) Clark was able to demonstrate that the Fed’s
manipulation of the supply of currency and high-powered money started after the
seasonality of interest rate had already disappeared.
Although the Fed was created in 1914, the Fed begun the seasonal movements of
currency in circulation after June 1917 and for high-powered money after September
1917. At the same time, “American interest rate seasonal came to an end in early 1915.”
(Clark, 1986, p. 91) Consequently, there was a 3-year lag between the moment when the
seasonal fluctuations of the short-term interest rate ended and the time when the Fed
started its counter-cyclical monetary policies. “It appears that interest rate seasonal
disappeared roughly 3 years before monetary policy actions intended to eliminate it
began.” (Clark, 1986, p. 114)
To extrapolate his finding, Clark studied the same sub-periods using the British,
French, and German open market discount rates. He found that in all countries the interest
rates had a very high seasonality prior to 1914. The British discount rate tended to rise
between August and November. The German rates would tend to be higher between
August and December, whereas the French rates would rise between September and
November. During January, the English and German rates would tend to decrease and the
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same phenomenon would be observable in February in France. “Comparing the pre-war
and postwar estimates, we see that the average monthly changes of each interest rate are
relatively subdued in the postwar period.” (Clark, 1986, p. 87)
Although interest rate seasonality seemingly disappeared concomitantly in most
countries after 1914, Clark clearly rejects the idea that the Fed “simultaneously eliminated
interest rate seasonals throughout the world.” (Ibid., p. 90) At that time, the U.S. lacked
the financial power “to export interest rate seasonality.” (Ibid.) It would seem that if
interest rate seasonality ceased at the same time all over the world, the Fed did not have
anything to do with it.
After grouping the data in overlapping 5-year periods, Clark used a Q-statistic on
the first three annual autocorrelations of the first differences of the time series. Because of
the test’s limitation it was impossible to pinpoint the exact time of change in seasonality.
Doing this he pointed to 1912-15 “as the period when interest rata seasonals came to an
end in the U.S. and Great Britain.” (Clark, 1986, p. 94)
Another interesting test was performed using the basic properties of a forecasting
model. According to these properties, the more seasonal is a series, the better are the
chances that forecast values for that series would include a seasonal pattern. Should, all at
once, that seasonality end, the forecast values would have failed more consistently to
predict the actual values. This is an implicit test that assumes the building of a forecasting
model for more sub-periods whose specifications does not change to accommodate for the
lack o f seasonality. One can estimate where the specification of the forecast model
changes by looking at (say) the variance of the forecast errors for different sub-periods.
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Clark used a forecasting model based on ARIMA(1,1) for the money rate and a
simple random walk model for 60-90-day commercial paper rate, 90-day money rate, and
British open market discount rate. He concluded that “the forecasting tests suggested that
seasonality ceased in the call money rate in March 1914, in the commercial paper rate in
November 1914, in the time money rate in August 1914, and in the British open market
discount rate in September 1914.” (p. 102)
Although it is true that interest rate seasonality ended in both the US and Great
Britain in 1914, it is not clear why. The Fed could not influence the global money market
as to determine the simultaneous elimination of seasonality in the US and Britain. Clark
suggested some alternative explanations. One could be the suspension of the gold standard
in 1914. Another one could be the massive gold imports into the US during 1915, and
1916, and the increased supply o f high-powered money.
Barsky, Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1988) tested the influence of the 1914
dismantling o f the gold standard on the changes in interest rate behavior. They analyzed
US. and British rates for the 1890-1910 and 1920-1933 periods separately. ’’The objective
is to document the change in regime in a way that avoids problems of how the transition
(to a new monetary regime) took place.” (p. 1130) The series they used were three-month
time loan rate for the U.S. and three-month rate on the on bankers’ bills available in
London. In both cases these were monthly observations, for the first week of each month.
The autocorrelation function for both subperiods and countries showed that in
both countries the interest rate was mean reverting during the 1890-1910 period, and there
was a significant negative autocorrelation. In the 1920-1933 period, the autocorrelations
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die out less quickly. The authors also performed regressions of the interest rate on its own
lagged values, including some seasonal dummies. For the 1890-1910 period, “the
coefficient on the lagged short rate is significantly less than one in both countries, and
there is important evidence o f seasonality.” (p. 1131) For the 1920-1933 period, the
interest rate was a random walk.
Barsky, et al (1988) integrated in their model the inflation rate and they were able
to build a theoretical model for the Fed’s actions that could have changed interest rate
behavior, “even if World War I and the breakdown o f the classical gold standard had not
occurred.” (p. 1136) The authors used switching regressions techniques and demonstrated
that “both interest rates and inflation changed behavior with high probability sometime
between the middle of 1914 and the middle of 1915 in both the U.S. and Britain.” (p.
1141)
Most interesting, Barsky et al. used the breakdown o f the Bretton Woods fixed
exchange rate regime in 1971 as a proof that the exchange rate regime, rather than the
Fed, could not be held responsible for the altered interest rate behavior after 1914. In
other words, what matters most is the behavior of the inflation rates, and the correlation
across countries in inflation rather that in interest rates. As a matter o f fact, the inflation
correlation coefficients across the US and Britain were 38.8 % higher than the interest rate
correlation coefficients for the 1890-1910 period, which were with 19.9 % higher for the
1920-1933 period. “Inflation rates shows more correlation across countries in the flexible
rate period, contrary to the usual expectation based on purchasing power parity
considerations” (Barsky, e ta L , 1988, p. 1143-5)
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The breakdown of gold standard in 1914 was not accompanied by an observed
change in the global linkages o f prices and interest rates. Contrary to what One might have
expected, the gold standard breakdown at the beginning of World War I did not modify
the self-imposed restrictions o f the theoretical correlation between interest rates and price
levels.
Fukuda (1995) performed an analysis of the altered behavior o f interest rates and
inflation rates for Japan, after the founding of the Bank of Japan, in 1882. Japan was not a
major international economic force either during the first World War or prior to it. Unlike
the US or Britain, one can not use Japan as an “exporter” of changes of interest rate
behavior to other countries. From this prospective, the Japanese case could be taken as a
benchmark.
Fukuda (1995) used the discount rate on commercial bills in Tokyo and Osaka.
Data were monthly averages of daily rates. The silver standard was established in Japan in
May 1885, the gold standard was legally introduced in October 1897, and the gold
standard was removed in September 1914. Fukuda used a unit root test to reveal the
timing in the change in interest rate behavior. The regression model was described in this
case as rt = c + BrtA .(Where r = interest rate, c = a constant term, B = the parameter to
be estimated, t = the time period.) The estimation periods were May 1880- December
1913, and January 1920-December 1935.
Based on these historical and statistical considerations, the author discovered that
after October 1897 the coefficient on the lagged interest rate was close to 1 and the
coefficient on the constant term was close to 0, implying that the interest rates were close
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to a random walk without drift. Before September 1897, the Z-statistic rejected the
presence o f a unit root in the interest rates. After October 1897, the test suggested that the
unit root cannot be rejected at even 10 % level of significance. In other words, the
introduction of the gold standard in Japan transformed the interest rate time series from
stationary to non-stationary. We have seen that much literature came to the conclusion
that the founding of the Fed in the USA transformed in the same manner the short-term
interest rate time series pattern. “Although our results also imply that a similar change
happened in Japan, the change took place much earlier than in other countries and long
before the breakdown o f the gold standard.” (p. 65)
In conclusion, even if the Bank of Japan was created in 1882 the Bank did not play
a crucial role in the Japanese money market until much later. Although the Bank o f Japan
started performing interest rate smoothing in 1885 (when the interest rate came to have
highly positive autocorrelations), it was only after 1897 that interest rates changed their
behavior. This is somehow surprising, but Fukuda attributes it to “the imperfections in the
Japanese financial system.” (p. 71) Because in 1880s there were simultaneously in
circulation government notes, national bank notes, as well as specie coins, in addition to
the convertible bank notes issued by the Bank of Japan, “the degree o f interest rate
smoothing was very limited at the beginning.” (Ibid.) “Only after the establishment of the
gold standard the reforms for the interest rate smoothing were almost completed.”
In the United States and United Kingdom, only after the breakdown o f the gold
standard, in August 1914, did interest rate time series change behavior. Another cause,
suggested by Fukuda, for the precocity o f the changed behavior o f interest rates in Japan
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was the fact that “Japan had a less strict gold reserve ratio objective under the gold
standard.” (Ibid., p.72) Consequently, so long as the gold reserve ratio objective was
weak under the gold standard, the Bank o f Japan could achieve its nominal interest rate
smoothing objective under the gold standard as the U.S. and U.K. could after the
breakdown o f the gold standard.

4.4 Summary o f the Literature Review
In conclusion, there have been expressed divergent opinions about the main
cause(s) that determined the changed behavior of short-term interest rate as well as when
the change occurred. Clark (1986) concluded that the founding of the Fed could not be
held solely responsible for the altered behavior o f interest rate after 1914. Actually, he
established that the Fed became actively involved in the US monetary markets after three
years o f existence, in 1917. In addition, he observed that the same phenomenon occurred
in more countries, at around the same time. In an initial study, Mankiw et al. (1987) found
the opposite thing. They analyzed monthly observations for short-term interest rate
between 1890 and 1933. They concluded that the founding of the Fed was entirely
responsible for the changed behavior of short-term interest rate
Angelini (1994), and Fishe and Wohar (1990) challenged Mankiw’s statement.
They found that either the data used by Mankiw et al. (1987) contained many errors or the
authors did not fully consider other historical events and institutional changes. Angelini
(1994) pinpointed the Aldrich-Veerland Act o f 1908 and the Money Committee o f 19171919 as potential sources for the changed behavior o f short-term interest rate. Mankiw et
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al. (1994) responded to these observations with a reply in which they acknowledged that
indeed other factors might well have influenced the changed behavior o f short-term
interest rate.
Miron (1986) used an indirect measure of the Fed’s implications on the US
financial markets. The instability of the pre-Fed period was characterized by a statistically
significant larger number o f financial panics than during the post-Fed period. From this
viewpoint, Miron (1986) considers that the founding of the Fed had a positive impact on
the US economy. Also, he determined that after 1914 short-term interest rate had a
smoother behavior. Combining these two findings, he believes that in 1914 there was a
clear shift in policy regime caused be the founding o f the Fed.
Barsky et al. (1988) tested the short-term interest rate behavior under both the
gold standard and the free floating system. They concluded that the breakdown of the gold
standard at the beginning of World War I was not responsible for the changed behavior of
the short-term interest rate.
We will show that neither the founding of the Fed, nor the breakdown o f the gold
standard (both o f which happened at around the same time, in 1914) were responsible for
the changed behavior of British short-term interest rate after 1914. In the next chapter o f
this thesis we will analyze the time series properties o f the weekly data for the British 60day draft rate between 1890 and 1933. We will try to discover if a structural break in the
series occurred, and if it did, what was (or were) the most likely cause(s).
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Table I. Sum m ary of L iterature Review
Authors (year)

Data and Methodology

Conclusion

Mankiw, Miron,
and Weil (1987)

Monthly observations on 3- and 6-month
loan rate at New York banks, (for the first
week of each month) 1890-1933. Simple
AR(1), autocorrelation analysis,
maximum likelihood procedure, and
Modigliani-Sutch relation between long
and short term rates.

Economic agents quickly understood
that the founding of the Fed changed
the stochastic environment in which
they were operating. More precisely, the
short term interest rate behavior
changed sometime between October
1914 and March 1915, only because of
the Fed.

Angelini (1994)

Used the same data set as Mankiw, et al.
Also employed AR(1) analysis on a
restricted time frame, between 1910 and
1920. Considered historical and structural
changes

Discovered that there are two additional
potential switching points that need to
be accounted for. The first point would
be the financial panic of 1907 and the
Aldrich-Vreeland act of 1908. The
second would be the 1917-1919 period,
when the Money Committee
permanently altered the functioning of
the American money market. The
founding of the Fed had nothing to do
with the altered behavior of interest rate
time series.

Mankiw, Miron,
and Weil (1994)

Replied to Angelini. As suggested by
Angelini, and using the same procedures,
they considered more possible statistical
breakpoints.

The American financial panic of 1907
together with the Aldrich-Vreeland act
of 1908 had indeed very significant
effects on the behavior of short-term
interest rates. Still, the biggest break
point in the time series occurred after
1914.

Fishe and Wohar
(1994)

They employed the same series as
Mankiw et al. Used weekly as well as
monthly data. Also they corrected data
errors. Used switching techniques in
order to select the most likely switch dates
of the time series.

For 3-month rates they found two
switch points. One would be in August
1909 and the other one in February
1915 (for the weekly data, it would be
in December 1915). For 6-month time
series the breakpoint would be June
1912 (the same point was obtained
when they used weekly data).The entire
term structure of interest rate was not
similarly affected by the founding of the
Fed. There was no regime change in
1914.

Miron (1986)

Studied the occurrences of financial
panics between 1890 and 1933. Seasonal
movements of stock market call loan rates
were analyzed. Also, studied the loanreserve ratio of the whole American

After the founding of the Fed the
frequency of financial panics and the
seasonal movements of interest rates
diminished. He was able to show that,
compared to the 1890-1914 period,
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banking system.

after 1914 there was a reduction in the
elasticity of loan supply with respect to
interest rate. This is consistent with
interest rate smoothing.

Clark (1986)

Monthly data on call money rate, twoand three-month commercial paper rate,
and three-month money rate for two
periods: 1890-1913 and 1919-1932.
Included British, French, and German
open market rates. (Arithmetic averages
of weekly and daily observations). Used
AR(1) analysis and forecasting models.

Although the Fed started its activity in
1914, only starting with the second half
of 1917 did the Fed begin the seasonal
movements of currency in circulation
and high-powered money in order to
smooth interest rates. In fact interest
rate seasonality disappeared between
1912 and 1915 in both Europe and the
US. It is obvious that the Fed did not
have anything to do with the changed
behavior of interest rate. Clark
suggested other possible factors, such as
the suspension of gold standard, or the
massive gold imports into the US
during the war.

Barsky, Mankiw,
and Weil (1988)

Monthly observations (first week of the
month) of New York three-month loan
rate and three-month rate oh bankers’
bills available on London. Employed
AR(1) analysis and an integrated model
of inflation and gold flow mechanism.

In both US and Britain, inflation and
interest rates changed behavior between
the middle of 1914 and middle of 1915.
The gold standard breakdown in August
1914 did not influence the changed
behavior of interest rates in either
Britain nor the US.

Fukuda (1995)

Used monthly (average) data on discount
rate on commercial bills in Tokyo and
Osaka. Performed ADF unit root tests for
various sub-periods, between 1874 and
1989.

Although the Bank of Japan (created in
1882) started performing interest rate
smoothing in 1885, the behavior
of short-term interest rate series
changed only after 1897. Since the gold
standard was introduced in Japan in
1897, it seems that its introduction (and
not the breakdownof the gold standard)
precipitated the change in behavior of
interest rate time series, from stationary
to non-stationary.
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Chapter 5. The Behavior of the British 60-day Draft Rate, 1890-1933
5.1 Data Description
Starting with the 1880s, the Bank o f England used the bank rate as the main policy
instrument aimed at controlling the gold flow in and out o f England. A higher British bank
rate would make deposits o f gold more attractive (in the form of sterling). A lower rate
would allow for an export of gold to countries where the rate was relatively higher. (In
theory, this mechanism would predict a stable equilibrium of gold and foreign exchange
markets. In reality, there were more factors that altered the pure mechanism o f the foreign
exchange and gold markets, known as “the rules o f the game.”) At the same time, the
bank rate was used (by commercial banks) as a benchmark for discount rates which
commercial banks would charge to their customers. The “60 days’ bankers’ drafts” was
the discount rate the commercial banks would charge for a (commercial) draft with a
period to maturity of up to 60 days.
A commercial draft is a check drawn by a bank on itself or its agent. In this
instance, a person who owes money to another buys the draft from the bank for cash -and
pays interest-, and hands it to the creditor who needs to have no fear that it might be
dishonored. The draft was used only when a creditor did not want to accept an ordinary
check (that was used mainly between well-known merchants). Since commercial banks
assumed a higher than usual risk, they needed to charge the draft buyers a slightly higher
rate than the rate charged ordinarily for discount operations. Moreover, commercial banks
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re-discounted most o f their commercial bills at the Bank of England’s counters, that used
the bank rate as official discount rate.
The 60 days’ bankers’ drafts rate was determined daily by commercial banks. The
bankers’ decision was based on the rate determined by the Bank o f England. The
Economist published weekly a special section dedicated to bank returns o f European
(including Britain) and North American (US and Canada) countries. In this section of the
Economist one finds information about discount and loan market in Britain. Daily data
were reported on the (official) bank rate, bankers’ drafts rate, market rates of discount
(for three, four, and six months) used by commercial banks, interest rates for loans, and
the rate for deposit allowances.
The 2296 weekly observations of 60 days’ bankers’ drafts rates (henceforth 60DR)
used in this thesis were gathered from the banks’ return section of The Economist
between January 3,1890 and December 30, 1933. The rates consist of the average o f the
highest and lowest rates mentioned for Friday (of each week).
The data was provided to me by Professor Mark Wohar. I have thoroughly
checked the data and I eliminated all data errors. Means and standard deviation were
computed for both levels and differences of interest rates. These statistics are reported in
Table II. Weeks in which changes in interest rates exceeded + or - 2.5 standard deviations
were designated as outliers. For example, if the change between the interest rate in week
11 and week 10 was above 2.5 standard deviations then week 11 was given a dummy
variable (called d l l ) where d l l was 1 in week 11 and 0 elsewhere. There have been
identified 61 outliers (presented in Table III). Graph 1 shows the first difference of the
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60DR time series, together with the + or - 2.5 standard deviation bands (including
outliers).

Table II. Basic Statistics of the 60DR Time Series and F irst Difference
60DR Time Series

First Difference 60DR

Mean

3.1874

0.000523

Maximum

7.19

3.22

Minimum

0.38

-1.5

Standard Deviation

1.444

0.2869

Statistic

:

The presence of (all) 61 outliers is entirely explained by the changes of the bank
rate levels performed by the Bank o f England. As we have seen in the previous chapters,
the Bank increased its rate when the export of gold would put the Bank’s reserves in
danger of depleting. The Bank reduced the bank rate when the import o f gold would
increase.
For instance, on August 4, 1893 the 60DR increased from 1.63 to 2.88 % and a
week later, the 60 DR jumped to 4.25 %. During the same period, the bank rate increased
from 2 to 3 %, and then to 4 %. The Economist suggested that “the withdrawals o f gold
for the US have continued on a large scale, and market rates hardened, in anticipation of a
further advance in the bank rate. The decision of the directors to advance the (bank) rate
to 4 % was, therefore, folly expected, and the market at once responded by bringing its
rates for fine paper o f all dates up to and over the bank level. Somewhat unsettled
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conditions prevail, and in the event of the higher rates failing to attract gold from the
Continent, where the stocks are being tightly held, it is quite possible the Bank may have
to take further steps for the protection of its rapidly diminishing reserve. The Imperial
Bank o f Germany has advanced its rate 1 per cent.” ( The Economist. August 12, 1893, p.
984)
On January 3, 1908, the 60DR decreased from 6.38 to 5 %, while the bank rate
was reduced from 7 to 6 %. The Economist comments that “The reduction o f the bank
rate, while it had been hoped for, was hardly expected so soon after the turn o f the year.
Next week was regarded as the most probable date for the first reduction. It was very
cordially received, being taken as an indication of a belief in the highest quarters that the
worst o f the American trouble is over. In the last few days of December a very large sum
was borrowed by the market from the Bank, and loan rates ruled at 6.5 to 7 %. ” ( The
Economist. January 4, 1908, p. 34)
Table III. The Outliers of the Time Series (Observations whose values changed
in one week by more than 2.5 standard deviations -in absolute value-)
No.
(0)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Date
a)
July 11, 1890
August 1, 1890
September 26,1890
November 7, 1890
December 5, 1890
January 9, 1891
January 16, 1891
July 17, 1891
October 30, 1891
December 4, 1891
January 8, 1892
March 4, 1892

Current
Value
(3)
4.13
4.75
4.75
5.75
3.75
2.75
2.00
1.88
3.31
2.5
2.00
2.00

Previous
Value
(2)
3.38
3.88
4.00
4.88
4.75
3.63
2.75
1.13
2.25
3.38
2.75 •
2.75
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Change
(4)=(3)-(2)
0.75
0.87
0.75
0.87
-1.00
-0.88
-0.75
-0.75
1.06
-0.88
-0.75
-0.75

13
May 13, 1892
14
May 20, 1892
April 28, 1893
15
16
May 12, 1893
17
June 2, 1893
18
June 9, 1893
19
August 4, 1893
20
August 11, 1893
21
September 8,1893
22
January 5, 1894
23
April 8, 1898
24
May 27, 1898
25 September 23, 1898
26
October 14, 1898
27
July 14, 1899
28
October 6, 1899
29 December 1, 1899
30 December 29, 1899
31
January 12, 1900
May 18, 1900
32
July 20, 1900
33
34
October 19, 1906
January 4, 1907
35
36
April 12, 1907
37 November 1, 1907
38 November 8, 1907
39
January 3, 1908
40
October 16, 1909
41
March 19, 1910
42
October 1, 1910
43
October 22, 1910
44
January 24, 1914
45 August 1, 1914 (*)
46 August 8, 1914 (*)
47 September 12, 1914
48
June 26, 1915
49 November 1, 1919
50 Novem bers, 1919
51
January 3, 1920
52
February 7, 1920
53
April 17, 1920
54
October 9, 1920

1.00
1.88
1.44
2.75
4.00
2.50
1.63
2.88
3.75
2.44
2.88
3.25
1.63
2.50
2.38
3.81
5.00
7.00
4.75
4.00
2.81
4.38
5.94
4.44
4.50
5.69
6.38
2.32
2.75
2.38
3.19
3.38
2.21
Bank closed
4.44
2.78
3.69
4.60
5.91
4.88
5.03
6.69

1.88
0.94
2.25
3.75
2.50
1.50
2.88
4.25
3.00
1.50
3.63
2.31
2.69
3.63
3.50
5.00
5.75
6.00
3.75
3.19
3.81
5.38
4.94
3.50
5.69
6.75
5.00
3.38
3.69
3.50
4.56
2.63
Bank closed
5.37
3.34
4.00
4.60
3.69
5.13
5.66
5.88
5.82
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0.88
-0.94
0.81
1.00
-1.50
-1.00
1.25
1.37
-0.75
-0.94
0.75
-0.94
1.06
1.13
1.12
1.19
0.75
-1.00
-1.00
-0.81
1.00
1.00
-1.00
-0.96
1.19
1.06
-1.38
1.06
0.94
1.12
1.37
-0.75
See note
See note
-1.12
1.22
0.91
-0.91
-0.78
0.78
0.85
-0.87

-0.93
April 9, 1921
6.37
5.44
February 9, 1929
4.25
5.25
1.00
September 28, 1929
5.25
6.00
0.75
2.25
3.25
1.00
July 25, 1931
4.35
1.10
August 1, 1931
3.25
5.50
4.50
-1.00
January 30, 1932
4.00
-0.94
February 20, 1932
4.94
Note: Due to the beginning of First World War, on the first week of
August 1914, the Bank o f England was closed (between August 1 and August 7, 1914). In
this interval, commercial banks used 5.5 % discount rate. (See also the source o f data.)
For statistical and historical reasons, the time series under analysis uses the 5.5 % rate for
August 1, 1914.
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5.2 Postulated Hypothesis
The last section described how an accurate time series was obtained. In this section
we will build a hypothesis based both on previous empirical works and historical events.
The hypothesis is based on two major considerations. On the one hand, the founding of
the Bank o f England in 1694 was mainly connected with the sustenance of the Crown’s
war effort. As described in previous chapters, for many historical and conjectural reasons,
the Bank o f England’s objectives changed substantially in the 1890s. On the other hand, in
1914 the Fed was founded specifically with the intention of eliminating the seasonal
behavior o f short term interest rates. The issues we analyze are: Did the Bank of England
adopt similar objectives to those of the Fed? If this is true, then when did it begin to have
objectives similar to those o f the Fed? In other words, when did the Bank of England start
to behave as if it were smoothing interest rates?
Mankiw and Miron (1986) could not reject the view that the short-term interest
rate was a random walk after the founding of the Fed, but not before. Miron (1986)
demonstrated that the Fed removed a strong seasonal fluctuation in the nominal interest

61

rate that ranged from about 6 % for the 1890-1914 period. These findings would suggest
that the Fed acted to smooth interest rate behavior after 1914. Interest rate smoothing
assumes that the money supply policy followed by the central bank allows the public “to
form a determinate expectation o f the future nominal money stock.” This policy, in turn,
under specific circumstances lowers the expected future nominal money stock each period.
(Goodfriend, 1988, p. 229)
Nonstationary short-term interest rate time series are consistent with interest rate
smoothing. It is much agreed (Clark, 1986, Goodfriend, 1987, 1988) that if we find the
60DR series non-stationary for a specific period, it is very likely that the Bank of England
behaved as if it were smoothing interest rates (but without declaring it). In order to
statistically test the 60DR series we use the first order autoregressive process, AR(1). In
discussing the methodology o f the analysis we will follow the paper of Holden and Perman
(1994).

5.3 The Methodology
We consider the AR(1) process defined by
r t

=

B

r t-\

+

e t

>

t =

2

>

0 )>

•

where rt stands for the 60DR at time t, B would be the coefficient to be estimated, r t l
stands for the lagged value of 60DR, and et define a variable (in sequence) of
independently and identically distributed variables with zero mean and constant variance.
The process described by (1) is stationary when the estimated B is less than one in
absolute value, i.e. -1 < B < 1. (This is also called the stationarity condition.) If and only if
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B is 1, the AR(1) process described by (1) has a unit root. In this situation the AR(1)
process with a unit root is non-stationary. Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) developed a
unit root test based on the null hypothesis that assumes B= 1, against the alternative
hypothesis that B< 1. Suppose the estimated value of B is b. Dickey and Fuller (henceforth
DF) (1979) demonstrated that the statistic T{b- B) — T(b -1) has a limiting distribution.
The critical values for unit root tests based on the limiting distribution for the statistic
were obtained by DF using Monte Carlo simulation techniques.
The values of rt of equation (1) are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS)
techniques. For this reason, the estimation would lose much of its significance if we do
not account for a constant term, past influence, outliers, and possible trend.
We subtract rtA from both sides of equation, and account for outliers, trend and
past influence equation (1) becomes
(2)
r,

= Dr, = c + (5, -1)/-,., + (B2 -

-

rt.2) + ( 5 3 -1)(t-,.2 - r,.3) + ...+(BW

+ Qt + 0,7;, + O2ro2+.. +Ot rok + e,
Now, we replace (B„ -1) coefficients by Cw and we obtain eq. (3)
(3)
r, - t

= Dr, =

c

+ C,t-m + C2(r„, -r:.2)+. +C„(rrw - r,_wA) + 0 / + 0,rol +., +Okrot +e,

where Dr is the difference between the level variable and its lagged value, c is a constant
term, Cx through Cw are the estimated coefficients for the number o f w -1 lagged values of
the differenced 60DR series, t is the observed linear trend component for the lagged values
included in equation, Ok are the dummy coefficients for the k outliers o f the series, and e
stands for the random error term. Equation (3) is known as the augumented Dickey Fuller
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-r,.w.,) +

(henceforth ADF) regression. This time, because we have differenced eq. (1) the null
hypothesis becomes H(0): Cx = Cj = 0 and is tested against the alternative hypothesis
H(a): cx< 0. (Lower case o f c means the estimated value )
In the next section we will use the ADF regression (equation 3) for different sub
periods of 60DR time series. Based on historical considerations and previous empirical
works, we hope to determine the most likely period when the stochastic processes
generating the time series changed. In the historical and previous research light, we believe
that the series changed its statistical behavior from stationarity to non-stationarity.
Theoretically, some exogenous factors must have changed in order to alter the 60DR time
series behavior. We will also try to suggest some of the historical factors that might have
determined this change. Much o f the literature asserted that the timing o f the founding of
the Fed determined the changed behavior of short-term rates in both Britain"and the US. Is
this true?

5.3.1 Stationarity
Equations (1) to (3) help us to determine the nature o f long-run movements of
economic variables. More specifically, it is necessary to establish whether random
disturbances have temporary or permanent effects on the level of a variable. A variable
that has no tendency to return to its mean following a disturbance is known as nonstationary. I f the impacts of a random disturbance were to dampen out over time, the
variable is said to be stationary. The variable could grow around a trend, (a case in which
the series is known as trend-stationary). Also, the series can be viewed in terms of its
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covariance over time. This is in opposition to a nonautocorrelated series which has
covariance equal to zero. Mathematically, a time series is stationary if it has a constant
mean for all time periods, and its covariance function does not depend on time.
A series is said to be integrated of order d, [1(d)], if it has a stationary invertible
autoregressive moving average representation after differencing d times. Consequently, a
series that is integrated of order zero, [1(0)], is itself stationary. The most common case of
a non-stationary series is a unit root, or is integrated o f order one, [1(1)]. Equation (1)
describes a random walk process if et is a stationary disturbance term which is not serially
correlated. This would be a special case of a non-stationary process. If a variable evolves
according to a random walk then shocks to that variable are cumulative and not ultimately
self reversing.
A particular case would be given by equation (la)
(la)

r, - r,., = a + e, .

where et (mean zero and constant variance) is

serially uncorrelated, and a is a parameter which can be considered the average predictable
increase in interest rate in each period t. In this case, the time series follows a random walk
with drift. Equation (lb)
(lb )

rt - rtA = a + ut ,

where ut is stationary, describes a non-

stationary process integrated of order one, [1(1)]. (It was differenced once to be
stationary.) As we can observe, the only difference between (la) and (lb ) consists in the
condition that determine the status of the error term If a series is integrated, then ut is
stationary but might be serially correlated, whereas if it is a random walk, then et is
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serially uncorrelated. It is important to mention that an integrated process of order greater
than zero has a variance that tends towards infinity.

5.4 Empirical Results
Clark (1986) suggested that the Fed begun seasonal movements of currency and
high-powered money during the latter half of 1917 in order to eliminate the interest rate
seasonality. At the same time, interest rate seasonals in both the US and Britain came to an
end in 1914. Since the Fed could have “exported interest rate smoothing” to Britain in the
second half of 1917, we tested for stationarity over more intervals of the 60DR time
series. Table IV includes the t statistic for the coefficients of the ADF regressions. The
null hypothesis, H(0) is that a unit root exists. We conclude that before mid-1917 the
series was stationary and after mid-1917, the 60DR time series was non-stationary. This
would imply that the Fed’s actions could have affected the behavior o f the British short
term interest rate time series at the end of 1917 or at the beginning o f 1918. At the same
time, in order to fortify this finding, we need to study whether the 60DR time series
changed its statistical behavior earlier.

Table IV. T-statistic of the ADF Regressions for the 60DR Time Series in the Second
H alf of 1917.
Intervals

Outliers

Jan. 3, 1890-July 7, 1917

Number
of
Observ.
1435

Aug. 4, 1917-Dec. 30, 1933
Jan. 3, 1890-Aug. 4, 1917

Statistical
significance

48

T-statistic for
the C l ADF
Coefficients
-4.09*

Reject H(0)

860

13

-2.08

Can’t R ej.H (0)

1439

48

-4.98*

Reject H(0)
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Sept. 8, 1917-Dec. 30, 1933

853

13

-2.23

Can’t Rej. H(0)

Jan. 3, 1890-Sept. 8, 1917

1444

48

-5.12*

Reject H(0)

Oct. 6, 1917-Dec.30, 1933

849

13

-1.86

Can’t Rej. H(0)

Jan. 3, 1890-Nov. 3, 1917

1449

48

-4.97*

Reject H(0)

Dec. 1, 1917-Dec. 3, 1933

844

13

-2.15

Can’t Rej. H(0)

Jan. 3, 1890-Dec. 3, 1917

1453

48

-6.11*

Reject H(0)

Jan. 5, 1918-Dec.30, 1933

840

13

-1.99

Can’t Rej. H(0)

Jan. 3, 1890-Jan. 5, 1918

1461

48

-5.84*

Reject H(0)

Feb. 2, 1918-Dec. 30, 1933

835

13

-1.98

Can’t Rej. H(0)

Notes: (1) The actual regressions included also a trend component. Since in none of
regressions was the trend statistically significant we ignored it. In most cases the
estimated coefficients for all outliers (dummy variables) are statistically significant.
(2) At 5% level o f significance the critical t value for ADF statistic is -2.86 (for a
very large sample).
(3) Source: Table 8.5.2 ofFuller (1976, p. 373).
(4) H(0) is the existence of a unit root.

Mankiw et al. (1987) shows that, in the US case, the short term interest rate
behavior changed in November 1914, immediately after the founding of the Fed. This fact
would indicate that, in a matter o f days, economic agents understood the implications of
the Fed’s announced targets. In consequence, the stochastic process generating the short
term interest rate time series changed.
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Barsky et al. (1988) confirmed Mankiw et al.’s finding that the Fed was the main
factor responsible for the changed behavior of short term interest rate time series. They
also extended this conclusion to Britain. “The switch occurred with high probability
sometime between the middle o f 1914 and the middle of 1915 in both the US and
Britain.” (1988, p. 1141) Based on these works, we used ADF regression equations to
test for stationarity o f the 60DR time series at the end o f 1914 and the beginning o f 1915.
Table V summarizes the t statistic for the C l coefficient o f ADF regressions.

Table V. T-statistic of the ADF Regressions for the 60DR Time Series in the
Second H alf of 1914.
Statistical
significance

44

T-statistic for
the C l ADF
Coefficient
-4.88*

Reject H(0)

1013

17

-2.07

Can’t Rej. H(0)

Jan. 3, 1890-Aug. 1, 1914

1283

44

-4.29*

Reject H(0)

Sept. 5, 1914-Dec. 30, 1933

1008

17

-2.72

Can’t Rej. H(0)

Jan. 3, 1890-Sept. 5, 1914

1287

46

-4.34*

Reject H(0)

Oct. 3, 1914-Dec.30, 1933

1004

15

-1.93

Can’t Rej. H(0)

Jan. 3, 1890-Nov. 7, 1914

1291

47

-4.65*

Reject H(0)

Dec. 5, 1914-Dec. 3, 1933

995

14

-2.78

Can’t Rej. H(0)

Jan. 3, 1890-Dec.5, 1914

1300

47

-3.96*

Reject H(0)

Jan. 2, 1915-Dec.30, 1933

992

14

-2.68

Can’t Rej. H(0)

Jan. 3, 1890-Jan. 2, 1915

1304

47

-4.21*

Reject H(0)

Feb. 2, 1915-Dec. 30, 1933

987

14

-2.62

Can’t Rej. H(0)

Intervals

Outliers

Jan. 3, 1890-July 4, 1914

Number
of
Observ.
1278

Aug. 1, 1914-Dec. 30, 1933
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Notes: (1) The actual regressions included also a trend component. Since in none of
regressions was the trend statistically significant we ignored it. In most cases the
estimated coefficients for all outliers (dummy variables) are statistically significant.
(2) At 5% level o f significance the critical t value for ADF statistic is -2.86 (for a
very large sample).
(3) Source: Table 8.5.2 o f Fuller (1976, p. 373).
(4) H(0) is the existence o f a unit root.

. Since the null hypothesis o f non-stationarity o f the 60DR time series can not be
accepted for all o f the coefficients o f pre-1914 intervals, we conclude that the series
remained stationary before the First World War or founding of the Fed. The 60DR time
series was non-stationary for all sub-periods after the second half o f 1914. Once more,
corroborated by previous empirical works, we need to extend our search for a break point
in the series.
As we have seen, using breakpoints of either 1917 or 1914 we find that the 60DR
time series changed its statistical behavior. These findings imply that the series could have
changed its behavior even sometime before the events of 1914. Angelini (1994) concluded
that the Aldrich-Vreeland act enforced after the American financial panic o f 1907 “played
a fundamental role in the elimination o f panics and hence it deeply affected the behavior of
short-term interest rate.” (p. 562) For this reason, we extended the ADF regression to the
last part o f 1907. Table VI reports the results of ADF regressions for selected intervals.
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Table VI. ADF Regression Results of the 60DR Time Series for Selected
Intervals of 1907 and 1908
Nr. o f
Outliers
43

Cl

T-statistic

Jan. 3, 1890-Dec. 31, 1910

Nr. o f
Obs
1082

-0.03

-3.78*

Statistical
Significance
Reject H(0)

Jan. 7, 1911-Dec. 30, 1933

1200

18

-0.01

-2.63

Can’t rej. H(0)

Jan. 3, 1890-Nov. 24, 1899

503

28

-0.05

-3.27*

Reject H(0)

D ec.l, 1889-Oct. 25, 1907

413

31

-0.05

-3.16*

Reject H(0)

Nov. 1, 1907-May 31, 1919

605

12

-0.04

-3.5*

Reject H(0)

June 7, 1919-Oct. 5, 1929

540

9

-0.01

-1.24

Can’t rej. H(0)

Oct. 12, 1929-Dec.30, 1933

221

4

-0.03

-3.01*

Reject H(0)

Jan. 3, 1890-Oct. 25, 1907

916

36

-0.02

-3.51*

Reject H(0)

Nov. 1, 1907-Dec.30, 1933

1366

25

-0.01

-3.13*

Reject H(0)

Jan. 3, 1890-March 6, 1908

935

39

-0.03

-3.62*

Reject H(0)

Mar. 13, 1908-Dec.30, 1933

1347

22

-0.01

-2.90*

Reject H(0)

Jan. 3, 1890-Oct. 16, 1908

967

39

-0.03

-3.77*

Reject H(0)

Nov. 6, 1908-Dec.30, 1933

1313

22

-0.01

-2.92*

Reject H(0)

Dec. 4, 1908-Dec. 30, 1933

1309

22

-0.01

-2.79

Can’t rej. H(0)

Jan. 9, 1909-Dec. 30, 1933

1304

22

-0.01

-2.84

Can’t rej. H(0)

Feb. 13, 1909-Dec. 30, 1933

1299

22

-0.01

-2.81

Can’t rej. H(0)

Mar. 13, 1909-Dec.30, 1933

1295

22

-0.01

-2.81

Can’t rej. H(0)

Intervals

Notes: (1) The actual regressions included also a trend component and 9 past differences,
as indicated by eq. (2). Since in none o f regressions was the trend statistically
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significant we ignored it. In most cases all estimated coefficients for outliers
(dummy variables) are statistically significant (at 5 % level).
(2) At 5% level o f significance the critical t value for ADF statistic is -2.86 (for a
very large sample).
(3) Source: Table 8.5.2 o f Fuller (1976, p. 373).
(4) H(0) is the existence of a unit root. Consequently, if we cannot reject the H(0)
we assume that the series was non-stationary on that interval.

As we can see, the earliest interval when the series began to be non-stationary was
December 1908 - December 1933. Because the March 1908- December 1933 period had
an estimated t-value (-2.9) very close to critical value of -2.86 we conclude that the 60DR
time series changed behavior from stationary to non-stationary between March 1908 and
December 1908.
Results of ADF test indicate that when one includes or excludes outliers, the
interest rate is stationary (i.e. reject the null hypothesis of unit root). Thus, during the
period prior to March 1908, ADF tests are invariant to the inclusion o f outliers. Contrary
to this, results for the period after December 1908 indicate that the ADF test rejects the
null o f unit root when outliers are not accounted for. However, the ADF test finds the
interest rate to be non-stationary when one accounts for outliers. When one does not take
into account large changes in the series as outliers, the existence o f weeks with large
changes may bias the ADF test towards finding the series to be stationary. The reason for
this is that these large changes may add a volatile component to the underlying data
generating process o f a unit root. If this volatility is large enough it can mask the random
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walk nature o f the series and make the process appear stationary when subjected to
standard unit root tests.
It is worth mentioning that when the ADF test was performed without either the
inclusion o f dummy variables accounting for outliers or trend component the results
suggest a different break point o f the 60DR time series. The most likely period when the
stochastic process generating the 60DR time series changed from generating a stationary
series to a non-stationary one would be between June 1911 and November 1911. We can
observe that the statistical sensitivity of the series to the inclusion or exclusion o f the
outliers is relatively high.
Another way for deciding whether the 60DR time series changed its statistical
behavior sometime during 1908 consists in the following rule (Holden and Perman, 1994,
p. 53): for the period in which the series was stationary the estimated autocorrelations
should fade away rapidly as the number o f lags increases whereas for the period when the
series was non-stationary the autocorrelations should decay slowly. Table VII presents a
sample of estimated autocorrelation coefficients o f the 60DR time series for the period
between 1890 and March 1908 and for the period between December 1908 and 1933.
Table VII. Sample A utocorrelation Coefficients for the 60DR Time Series.
(January 3, 1890-March 13, 1908 and December 4, 1908-December 30, 1933)

Number of

Sample Autocorrelation Coefficients

Lags

January 3, 1890-March 13, 1908-December 4, 1908-December 30, 1933

1

0.969 (0.707)

0.982 (0.857)

2

0.927 (0.666)

0.960 (0.822)
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3

0.883 (0.639)

0.937(0.811)

4

0.841 (0.646)

0.912 (0.792)

5

0.801 (0.609)

0.89 (0.785)

6

0.765 (0.598)

0.87 (0.744)

7

0.731 (0.535)

0.851 (0.731)

S

0.7 (0.562)

0.833 (0.731)

9

0.67 (0.539)

0.816(0.716)

10

0.643 (0.504)

0.8 (0.707)

12

0.602 (0.494)

0.762 (0.667)

24

0.383 (0.368)

0.552 (0.495)

36

0.352(0.353)

0.395 (0.354)

48

0.458 (0.404)

0.294 (0.263)

60

0.378 (0.343)

0.138 (0.119)

Notes: a) The estimated values of the autocorrelation coefficients are all statistically
significant at 1 % level of significance. (Q-Statistic)
b) In parentheses are the autocorrelation coefficients that account for dummy
variables (outliers).
We can observe that in the period after December 1908 the estimated
autocorrelation coefficients fade away quicker as the number o f lags increases compared
to the period before March 1908. Graph 3 and 4 show that for a longer than 36-period lag
the autocorrelation coefficients for the second period faded away faster than for the first
period. The long fade away period and the cyclical period o f the autocorrelation

74

Autocorrelation function o f R, saaple froa

1 to

96?

1 .0 000

,62966

888888

.25933

k

k
0

162

81

243

Order of lags

GRAPH. #3 SAMPLE AUTOCORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
January 1890-March 1908

75

322

Autocorrelation function of R< sanple froa

1 to 1313

1.B000

,59521

19041

-.21438
0

110

220

330

Order of lags

GRAPH. #4 SAMPLE AUTOCORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
December 1908-December 1933

76

437

coefficients for the first period suggests that, between 1890 and 1908, the 60DR time
series had a long memory. Although this fact does not indicate that the series was not
stationary over the 1890-1908 interval, it does indicate that the series was extremely
sensitive to shocks.
If a time series with unit root (or non-stationary) were shocked, the shocks would
persist forever. If a time series, instead, follow a stationary process this suggests that a
shock would persist a certain (finite) time only. The duration of the shock persistence
would vary from case to case but the series would eventually absorb the shock. (The
values of the series would revert to a long-run mean.) Graph 3 suggests a very long
absorption time of shocks by the 60DR time series. The persistent nature o f time series
and its implications on the AR(1) models have been studied using the Fractionally
Integrated Autoregressive Moving Average models. (Choi and Wohar, 1994) According
to the Fractionally Integrated models the unit-root hypothesis is a special and restrictive
case o f a time series. Long-memory processes are stationary.
The 60DR time series was generated from a stationary process between 1890 and
the beginning o f 1908, but its autocorrelation function decays much more slowly than that
from “classical” stationary processes. This finding, as we have seen earlier, is consistent
with “a stationary process with a long memory.” (Choi and Wohar, 1994, p. 919) A long
memory process has the ability to display significant dependence between observations
widely separated in time.
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5.5 The 1907 American Crisis and the Bank o f England
Prior to the First World War, Britain was the leading global economic force. It is
hard for one to believe that the US economic crises could have had a big impact on the
London decision makers. Nevertheless, economic connections between Britain and the US
were strong enough to determine a crisis or a boom to be easily transmitted from either
Britain to the US or vice versa. Moreover, the monetary systems of both Britain and the
US were based on the gold standard, whereas the monetary (institutional) structure of
Britain was different from the monetary structure of the US.
The British and American convergence of monetary goals (Britain and the US
wanted to maintain the gold standard) and divergence of monetary means (due to the fact
that Britain had a central bank, but the US did not) had more implications. First, since
there were strong ties between the British and American economies, a situation o f crisis in
the US would tend to spread to Britain. Paradoxically, because of institutional differences
between Britain and the US, a situation of crisis in Britain would tend to spread over to
the US slower than a US crisis spread to Britain.
Secondly, due to the monetary institutional differences between Britain and the
US, when a crisis began in the US, Britain reacted promptly to protect the gold standard.
As we have seen earlier, in such situations, the method used most by the Bank of England
was the increase of the bank rate. Contrary to the US, where in cases of financial crises
interest rates would increase suddenly, in Britain the increase of the bank rate was gradual.
The Bank not only decided weekly whether or not to change its bank rate, but it also
“became much more tender in its attitude towards trade and industry.” (Morgan, 1965, p.
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216) Consequently, after the 1907 American crisis, the Bank of England acted as if it
intended to smooth interest rates.
Thirdly, after 1907, the Bank o f England diversified its monetary policy tools. The
most non-conformist one was the direct operations in the gold market. The Bank, would
raise the buying price o f bullion, raise the selling price o f gold bars, manipulate the buying
and selling price o f foreign coin, and it even made interest-free advances to gold
importers. Occasionally, in order to protect the gold reserves, the Bank imposed on the
market a higher interest rate without increasing its bank rate. (Administratively,
sometimes, the Bank charged a higher rate for advances than for discounts, or it
discriminated against certain types o f bills.) The new monetary tools used by the Bank
were designed at both protecting the domestic economy and the gold standard. More
specifically, the Bank did not want to harm the economy by increasing the bank rate.
Clark (1935) recognized the determinant role of London for the financing trade of
the US at the beginning o f the 19th century. ”In the matter o f foreign exchange and
foreign trade financing the US were for the most part dependent upon the London money
market. The US foreign trade was largely financed abroad. There was no power for the
New York money market to exert a decisive influence on gold movements by means of
money rate changes or the settling o f international balances by offering bankers’
acceptances. “ (Clark, 1935, p. 15-16)
On October 22, 1907 the Knickerbocker Trust went bankrupt and cash payments
were suspended “practically throughout the American banking system.” (Morgan, 1965,
p. 222) Immediately, because American banks needed cash, gold began to flow out of

79

Britain to the US and the Bank of England increased its (bank) rate from 5.5 % in October
to 7 % in November 1907. The Aldrich-Vreeland act of June 1908 was highly praised by
the British media and the most influential economic magazine of the time believed that “it
would undoubtedly be a means of providing relief in the event o f acute monetary
stringency.” ( The Economist. June 13, 1908, p. 1245) Not only the media was favorable
to the new American currency act, but also the Bank’s officials believed that the act
“would help British commercial banks, in case a similar panic occurred in New York.”
(Ibid., p. 1138)
The Bank of England never declared (publicly) that starting with a certain period it
would change its main monetary policy goal from protecting the gold reserves to
smoothing interest rates. This fact would suggest that after 1908, when the monetary
environment changed not only in the US, but also in Britain, the Bank o f England
gradually came to alter the target of its monetary policy.
We have seen that the 60DR time series became non-stationary after December
1908. Researchers also agree on the theory that the non-stationarity of the interest rate
would be consistent with interest rate smoothing employed by central banks. At the same
time, our finding is compatible with the rational expectations theory according to which
only unannounced (or unpredicted) events can change (persistently) economic behavior.

Conclusion
Previous works suggested that the founding of the Fed or the breakdown o f the
gold standard in 1914 would have been the main responsible cause for the changed
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behavior o f short-term interest rate time series for both the US and Britain. Using ADF
tests, our results imply that the British 60-day bankers’ draft rate time series changed its
statistical behavior sometime between March 1908 and December 1908. Between 1890
and March 1908 the series was stationary (with possible long memory). Between
December 1908 and December 1933 the series was non-stationary (we could not reject the
hypothesis o f a unit root). Historically, the March 1908-December 1908 period coincides
with the end o f the American financial panic of 1907 and with the adoption of the AldrichVreeland act in June 1908. Although it is not very clear how the American crisis affected
so much the monetary goals pursued by the Bank o f England, it seems the only plausible
cause.
At the beginning o f the financial panic o f 1906-7 American banks were facing a
very severe liquidity crisis. Since the American banks badly needed cash, they were willing
to borrow from British commercial banks at much higher rates than the British banks
could lend to domestic customers. The British commercial banks, in turn, would buy gold
from the Bank o f England and would ship it over to the American banks. To protect its
gold reserves, the Bank of England increased the bank rate. The Bank believed that
commercial banks would be deterred from borrowing money from the Bank and buying
gold with it (at the official rate). Despite the high level of the bank rate, the gold continued
to be massively exported to the US during the 1906-7 crisis.
The American crisis peaked in October 1907. By March 1908 the financial crisis
was over. To prevent a future crisis, in June 1908 the US Congress passed the Aldrich-
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Vreeland act. The act granted special emergencies powers to New York City banks and
created the National Monetary Commission. (Miron, 1986, p. 131)
The timing o f the 1907 American crisis and the passage o f the Aldrich-Vreeland
act coincides entirely with the period when the behavior of British short-term interest rate
time series changed. We believe that the massive export of gold from Britain to the US
during the 1907 crisis determined the Bank of England to follow more closely the seasonal
movements in domestic money demand. At the same time, the Aldrich-Vreeland act
increased the financial stability of the American banking system. As a consequence,
American commercial banks ceased to borrow “emergency money” from British banks.
After 1908 the Bank of England did not have to worry so much about protecting its gold
reserves since the American banks were required to meet the unexpected withdrawal
demands with their own permanent reserves.
According to Clark (1986) the Fed begun interest rate smoothing in the last part o f
1917, while the (American) short-term interest rate time series became non-stationary in
the last part o f 1914. Angelini (1994) argues that the US short-term interest rate time
series became non-stationary in 1908, after the enforcement of the Aldrich-Vreeland act.
In consequence, it seems that the Fed activity (per se) did not influence the behavior of
short-term interest rate time series. In addition, Fukuda (1995) shows that the founding of
the Bank o f Japan did not alter the behavior o f interest rate time series in Japan. Contrary
to the models of interest rate smoothing, the changes in the behavior of interest rates were
gradual.
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We have seen that the founding of the Fed had no effect on the behavior of British
short-term rates. We also determined that the American financial panic o f 1907 seems to
have changed the banking environment both in the US and Britain. After 1908, the
increased stability of the American banking system eliminated much o f the London money
market pressure. For this reason, the Bank of England could better distinguish between
domestic and foreign monetary crises. Consequently, the Bank of England begun to follow
more closely the seasonal movements of domestic interest rates. Although the Bank of
England never declared openly that it would supply “elastic currency” to the economy,
the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that after March 1908 the Bank started to
smooth interest rates.

6.1 Future Research
In order to better understand the connection between central banking and interest
rate behavior, future research need to extend the analysis of when the behavior o f short
term interest rates changed for both more interest rate time series and for different
countries.
Prior to the First World War, the economic relations between the US and Britain
were, in many respects, peculiar. First, Britain had prime interests in the US economy.
Secondly, there existed some major structural differences between the US and British
economies. Due to structural differences, Britain was more vulnerable to American
economic crises than the vice-versa. For these reasons, the study o f interest rate behavior
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needs to be extended to more European countries, where central banks had been in place
before the American crisis o f 1907.
The works of Fukuda (1995) and Angelini (1994) revealed that, in the Japanese
and (restricted) American case, the behavior of short-term interest rates changed
independently o f the time when the central banks were founded. In the Britain case we
have shown that the 60-day bankers’ drafts time series changed its statistical behavior in
1908, long before the Fed was founded in the US. Yet, we could not demonstrate that the
British interest rate behavior was the result of (only) domestic monetary policy. For this
reason, more studies need to be done on the French, German, and Italian short-term
interest rates behavior, countries in which, decades before 1908, there had existed central
banks.
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